Local conventional defense shifts the final nuclear decision onto the aggressor

Evidence

This is the kind of tactic that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was looking for in the following passage: … In the future it may thus be feasible to place less reliance upon deterrence of vast retaliatory power…Thus, in contrast to the 1950 decade, it may be that by the 1960 decade the nations which are around the Sino-Soviet perimeter can possess an effective defense against full-scale conventional attack and thus confront any aggressor with the choice between failing or himself initiating nuclear war against the defending country. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 318

Categorization

• XREF: The tactic of leaving the ‘last clear chance’ to the other — echoes the reader’s hostage-mechanics frame where credible commitment substitutes for state legitimacy. — connects to: A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 416

Broader Connections

• A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control #expands (0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 416