Stranger-based game experiments miss most real moral contexts.

Evidence

Since most moral behavior occurs in the context of our relationships with people whom we know personally and/or about whom we care deeply, psychological accounts of morality relying on studies of interactions between strangers fail to account for the majority of contexts in which moral issues actually arise and matter. We recognize that economic games are a current favorite among economists, researchers in business schools, and some psychologists. They are neat, straightforward, and easily modeled mathematically. However, the literature on human cooperation extends far beyond the literature on behavior in these games (see, e.g. for instance, Clark & Lemay 2010; Tyler 2010; and the now burgeoning literature in relationship science generally). — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 338

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s Big God / partner-choice analysis: the mutualism account built on stranger games systematically misses the communal bonds that religious communities rely on — precisely what ritual apostasy destroys. — connects to: Some cultures punish cooperators rather than freeriders in economic games — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 831; Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2; Sociability among equals is an artificial stylized game, not a return to natural self — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 378 (+1 more)

Related

• Some cultures punish cooperators rather than freeriders in economic games (similarity 0.84)
• Morality evolves from individual partner-choice competition, not group selection. (similarity 0.83)
• Partner selection produces genuine moral feelings, not just narrow self-interested cooperation. (similarity 0.82)
• Some punishment in public goods games is retributive justice-seeking, not cooperation enforcement. (similarity 0.82)
• Moral norms differ by relationship type, not by one universal strategy. (similarity 0.82)
• Reputation and anticipated repeat interactions drive stranger cooperation from the first round. (similarity 0.82)
• People cooperate more when they expect repeated dealings or know a partner’s reputation (similarity 0.81)
• Morality evolved because fair partners were preferred in cooperative interactions (similarity 0.80)
• People punish free-riders partly to correct inequality, not only to enforce cooperation. (similarity 0.80)
• Morality may have evolved via partner choice over partner control (similarity 0.79)
• Morality extends beyond fairness among strangers to relational obligations (similarity 0.79)
• Human morality is contingent rather than invariant across circumstances. (similarity 0.79)
• Moral behavior shifts with the market supply and demand of cooperative partners (similarity 0.79)
• Morality evolved as a propensity for fair cost-benefit sharing among cooperators. (similarity 0.79)
• Recasting an economic game as mutual hospitality drops offers to locally appropriate sharing norms. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Some cultures punish cooperators rather than freeriders in economic games #exemplifies (0.80) — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 831
• Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms. #expands (0.78) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 2
• Sociability among equals is an artificial stylized game, not a return to natural self #corroborates (0.75) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 378
• Human morality is contingent rather than invariant across circumstances. #expands (0.72) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 390