Inclusive authoritarian legacies reduce zero-sum ethnic politics during democratic transitions

Evidence

More inclusionary regimes faced transition to multiparty politics with less competitive, antagonistic, and divisive patterns of interethnic relations both at the elite and communal levels. They were thus less likely to experience electoral violence. The opportunity structure engendered by authoritarian rule created more options for elites to forge cross-ethnic coalitions, as well as different incentives for intragroup mobilization. Specifically, the absence of blatant discrimination of certain groups reduced zero-sum perceptions of politics and opened up for interethnic elite negotiation. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 38

Categorization

• XREF: Directly bears on the reader’s research question — this is the mechanism by which threatened-privilege mobilization (here the obverse: absence of blatant discrimination defusing it) is tied to the regime type’s opportunity structure. — connects to: Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 10; Authoritarian-era institutional choices can shape political behavior after democratic openings. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 13; African ruling coalitions nearly always include some ethno-regional intermediaries, but inclusion depth varies — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 23 (+14 more)

Related

• Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.94)
• Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not. (similarity 0.91)
• Preventing ethnic dominance reduces electoral violence during democratic transitions (similarity 0.90)
• Exclusionary authoritarian regimes cultivate zero-sum perceptions that outlast them and drive electoral violence (similarity 0.90)
• Narrow authoritarian coalitions raise mobilization stakes and zero-sum perceptions among excluded groups. (similarity 0.90)
• Authoritarian coalition-building approaches shape post-transition political incentives. (similarity 0.89)
• Authoritarian regimes vary in how inclusively they build ethnic ruling coalitions. (similarity 0.88)
• Authoritarian-rule legacies plausibly drive electoral violence beyond Africa (similarity 0.88)
• African ruling coalitions nearly always include some ethno-regional intermediaries, but inclusion depth varies (similarity 0.87)
• Authoritarian-era rhetoric norms constrain whether elites can later mobilize voters through ethnic hostility. (similarity 0.87)
• Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.87)
• Exclusionary versus cooperative elite coalition legacies shape post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.86)
• Authoritarian-era institutional choices can shape political behavior after democratic openings. (similarity 0.85)
• Electoral violence in ethnically divided societies erupts when elections become ethnic head counts. (similarity 0.84)
• Lifting authoritarian repression explains only some post-transition ethnic violence. (similarity 0.82)

Broader Connections

• Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk. #expands (0.90) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 94
• Exclusionary authoritarian regimes cultivate zero-sum perceptions that outlast them and drive electoral violence #contradicts (0.88) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 98
• Exclusionary versus cooperative elite coalition legacies shape post-transition electoral violence risk. #expands (0.85) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 96
• Preventing ethnic dominance reduces electoral violence during democratic transitions #corroborates (0.82) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 87
• Inclusive clientelist patronage across ethnic elites can dampen inter-ethnic rivalry #corroborates (0.75) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 75