Authoritarian regimes vary in how inclusively they build ethnic ruling coalitions.

Evidence

At one end of the continuum are regimes that Rothchild & Foley (1988) label ‘elite consensual systems’, characterized by broadly incorporative grand coalitions, where most major ethnic groups were allowed some participation in decisionmaking processes, typically through various cabinet or executive appointments to ethnic representatives (Arriola, 2009). Senegal under president Senghor’s one-party regime is a case in point, where the government relied on inclusion of a majority of Senegal’s ethno-regional and religious groups, and no single ethnic group faced discrimination. … At the other end of the spectrum are regimes that effectively monopolized state executive power at the hand of a single ethnic group (Wimmer, Cederman & Min, 2009). Examples at the extreme end include Burundi (1966–88), where the Tutsi minority formed the ruling coalition while the Hutu majority were excluded under the military regime, and the settler oligarchy of South Africa, where the minority Afrikaners governed while excluding the black majority. Beyond this extreme, we find regimes that survived through exclusionary approaches without monopolizing the state. These relied on support from constituencies within the ruling coalition, while simultaneously restricting political activity and resources for excluded groups (Huntington, 1970). Kenya, as the empirical analysis demonstrates, fits this category. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 28

Categorization

• DEFINE: Establishes the elite-consensual vs. monopolistic/exclusionary spectrum that anchors the book’s regime typology.
• XREF: connects to: African ruling coalitions nearly always include some ethno-regional intermediaries, but inclusion depth varies — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 23; Authoritarian regime stability ultimately rests on informal patronage networks brokered by ethnic elites — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 22; Inclusive authoritarian legacies reduce zero-sum ethnic politics during democratic transitions — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 38 (+4 more)

Related

• Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not. (similarity 0.88)
• African ruling coalitions nearly always include some ethno-regional intermediaries, but inclusion depth varies (similarity 0.88)
• Authoritarian coalition-building approaches shape post-transition political incentives. (similarity 0.88)
• Inclusive authoritarian legacies reduce zero-sum ethnic politics during democratic transitions (similarity 0.88)
• Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.88)
• Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.86)
• Authoritarian-rule legacies plausibly drive electoral violence beyond Africa (similarity 0.85)
• Exclusionary versus cooperative elite coalition legacies shape post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.84)
• Narrow authoritarian coalitions raise mobilization stakes and zero-sum perceptions among excluded groups. (similarity 0.83)
• Exclusionary authoritarian regimes cultivate zero-sum perceptions that outlast them and drive electoral violence (similarity 0.83)
• Authoritarian-era rhetoric norms constrain whether elites can later mobilize voters through ethnic hostility. (similarity 0.83)
• Authoritarian-era coalition-building logics explain later divergence in electoral violence between Kenya and Zambia. (similarity 0.82)
• Authoritarian regime stability ultimately rests on informal patronage networks brokered by ethnic elites (similarity 0.81)
• Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund — Electoral violence and the legacy of authoritarian rule in Kenya and Zambia (similarity 0.81)
• Preventing ethnic dominance reduces electoral violence during democratic transitions (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. #corroborates (0.88) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 10
• Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk. #expands (0.85) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 94
• Inclusive authoritarian legacies reduce zero-sum ethnic politics during democratic transitions #qualifies (0.82) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 38
• Authoritarian coalition-building approaches shape post-transition political incentives. #expands (0.80) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 30
• Narrow authoritarian coalitions raise mobilization stakes and zero-sum perceptions among excluded groups. #corroborates (0.80) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 34