Exclusionary authoritarian regimes cultivate zero-sum perceptions that outlast them and drive electoral violence
Evidence
A key mechanism for explaining electoral violence, thus, is the propensity of exclusionary regimes to cultivate perceptions of politics as a zero-sum game. When such perceptions outlast the authoritarian era and transfer into the electoral arena, an elevated sense of threat fuels electoral violence. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 98
Categorization
- XREF: Connects directly to the reader’s core research on threatened-privilege mobilization and zero-sum beliefs as a general mechanism; this is the theoretical mechanism statement. — connects to: Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 4; Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 10; Narrow authoritarian coalitions raise mobilization stakes and zero-sum perceptions among excluded groups. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 34 (+6 more)
Related
- Narrow authoritarian coalitions raise mobilization stakes and zero-sum perceptions among excluded groups. (similarity 0.92)
- Inclusive authoritarian legacies reduce zero-sum ethnic politics during democratic transitions (similarity 0.90)
- Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not. (similarity 0.89)
- Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.89)
- Authoritarian-rule legacies plausibly drive electoral violence beyond Africa (similarity 0.88)
- Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.86)
- Authoritarian coalition-building approaches shape post-transition political incentives. (similarity 0.86)
- Preventing ethnic dominance reduces electoral violence during democratic transitions (similarity 0.85)
- Authoritarian-era rhetoric norms constrain whether elites can later mobilize voters through ethnic hostility. (similarity 0.83)
- Authoritarian-era institutional choices can shape political behavior after democratic openings. (similarity 0.83)
- Authoritarian regimes vary in how inclusively they build ethnic ruling coalitions. (similarity 0.83)
- Exclusionary versus cooperative elite coalition legacies shape post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.83)
- African ruling coalitions nearly always include some ethno-regional intermediaries, but inclusion depth varies (similarity 0.80)
- Electoral violence in ethnically divided societies erupts when elections become ethnic head counts. (similarity 0.80)
- Authoritarian-era coalition-building logics explain later divergence in electoral violence between Kenya and Zambia. (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- Exclusionary versus cooperative elite coalition legacies shape post-transition electoral violence risk.
#corroborates(0.85) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 96 - Authoritarian-rule legacies plausibly drive electoral violence beyond Africa
#expands(0.82) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 104