Exclusionary versus cooperative elite coalition legacies shape post-transition electoral violence risk.

Evidence

First, legacies structure options for cross-ethnic coalition-building and cooperation, making electoral violence more or less likely. By emphasizing ethnicity over other political cleavages, exclusionary coalitionbuilding engenders interethnic relations characterized by fragmentation and competition. Thus, while Zambia’s opposition drew support from all ethnic groups, Kenya’s opposition was fragmented and polarized along ethnic lines. Furthermore, in Zambia the legacy of cooperative interethnic elite relations reduced the perceived risks associated with the transition and enabled inter-elite bargaining that solved several contentious issues. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 96

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 4; Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 10; Electoral violence in ethnically divided societies erupts when elections become ethnic head counts. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 14 (+9 more)

Related

• Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not. (similarity 0.92)
• Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.90)
• Authoritarian coalition-building approaches shape post-transition political incentives. (similarity 0.90)
• Authoritarian-era coalition-building logics explain later divergence in electoral violence between Kenya and Zambia. (similarity 0.89)
• Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.88)
• Authoritarian-rule legacies plausibly drive electoral violence beyond Africa (similarity 0.87)
• African ruling coalitions nearly always include some ethno-regional intermediaries, but inclusion depth varies (similarity 0.87)
• Inclusive authoritarian legacies reduce zero-sum ethnic politics during democratic transitions (similarity 0.86)
• Exclusionary ethnic coalition-building emerged only after Kenya’s broad early post-independence ruling alliance. (similarity 0.86)
• Ethnic balancing under authoritarian rule built cooperative Zambian elites (similarity 0.85)
• Authoritarian-era rhetoric norms constrain whether elites can later mobilize voters through ethnic hostility. (similarity 0.85)
• Authoritarian regimes vary in how inclusively they build ethnic ruling coalitions. (similarity 0.84)
• Preventing ethnic dominance reduces electoral violence during democratic transitions (similarity 0.84)
• Electoral violence in ethnically divided societies erupts when elections become ethnic head counts. (similarity 0.83)
• Exclusionary authoritarian regimes cultivate zero-sum perceptions that outlast them and drive electoral violence (similarity 0.83)