African ruling coalitions nearly always include some ethno-regional intermediaries, but inclusion depth varies

Evidence

In heterogeneous societies without a majority group able to rule on its own, incumbents depended on the support of the leadership of other ethnic groups to ensure regime survival. Almost all ruling coalitions in Africa involved the inclusion of some ethno-regional intermediaries, but the degree of ethnic inclusion (both the size and ethnic plurality) varied significantly. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 23

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Authoritarian regimes vary in how inclusively they build ethnic ruling coalitions. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 28; Inclusive clientelist patronage across ethnic elites can dampen inter-ethnic rivalry — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 75; Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 4 (+2 more)

Related

• Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.89)
• Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not. (similarity 0.89)
• Authoritarian regimes vary in how inclusively they build ethnic ruling coalitions. (similarity 0.88)
• Inclusive authoritarian legacies reduce zero-sum ethnic politics during democratic transitions (similarity 0.87)
• Exclusionary versus cooperative elite coalition legacies shape post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.87)
• Authoritarian coalition-building approaches shape post-transition political incentives. (similarity 0.86)
• Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.84)
• Authoritarian-rule legacies plausibly drive electoral violence beyond Africa (similarity 0.83)
• Ethnic balancing under authoritarian rule built cooperative Zambian elites (similarity 0.82)
• Perceived regional imbalance in Zambia’s ruling party fed recurring accusations of ethnic bias (similarity 0.82)
• Authoritarian-era coalition-building logics explain later divergence in electoral violence between Kenya and Zambia. (similarity 0.81)
• Authoritarian-era rhetoric norms constrain whether elites can later mobilize voters through ethnic hostility. (similarity 0.81)
• Inclusive clientelist patronage across ethnic elites can dampen inter-ethnic rivalry (similarity 0.81)
• Exclusionary authoritarian regimes cultivate zero-sum perceptions that outlast them and drive electoral violence (similarity 0.80)
• Narrow authoritarian coalitions raise mobilization stakes and zero-sum perceptions among excluded groups. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Authoritarian regimes vary in how inclusively they build ethnic ruling coalitions. #corroborates (0.85) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 28
• Inclusive authoritarian legacies reduce zero-sum ethnic politics during democratic transitions #corroborates (0.85) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 38
• Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not. #corroborates (0.82) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 4
• Perceived regional imbalance in Zambia’s ruling party fed recurring accusations of ethnic bias #exemplifies (0.80) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 76
• Inclusive clientelist patronage across ethnic elites can dampen inter-ethnic rivalry #corroborates (0.78) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 75