Electoral violence in ethnically divided societies erupts when elections become ethnic head counts.
Evidence
Elections hold the potential for fueling violence in ethnically divided societies when leaders suddenly become reliant on securing popular support (Mann, 2005; Snyder, 2000), and the ballot box offers no institutional protection for the minority against majority rule. Electoral violence, levied to influence electoral results or to protest announced results, often erupts along ethnic lines as electoral dynamics tilt towards ‘ethnic head counts’ (Chandra, 2004; Kuhn, 2015). — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 14
Categorization
- XREF: Echoes the threatened-privilege mobilization literature the reader is testing: majority ethnic groups winning ‘head counts’ face zero-sum stakes that map onto the reader’s status-threat frame across identity axes. — connects to: In divided societies, voter turnout may matter more than ideological conviction. — Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Roger Macginty, Ethnic Outbidding and Party…, 79; Preventing ethnic dominance reduces electoral violence during democratic transitions — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 87; Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 10 (+5 more)
Related
- Preventing ethnic dominance reduces electoral violence during democratic transitions (similarity 0.88)
- Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.86)
- Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not. (similarity 0.85)
- Authoritarian-era rhetoric norms constrain whether elites can later mobilize voters through ethnic hostility. (similarity 0.84)
- Inclusive authoritarian legacies reduce zero-sum ethnic politics during democratic transitions (similarity 0.84)
- Authoritarian-rule legacies plausibly drive electoral violence beyond Africa (similarity 0.84)
- Exclusionary versus cooperative elite coalition legacies shape post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.83)
- Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.83)
- In divided societies, voter turnout may matter more than ideological conviction. (similarity 0.81)
- Authoritarian-era institutional choices can shape political behavior after democratic openings. (similarity 0.81)
- Authoritarian coalition-building approaches shape post-transition political incentives. (similarity 0.81)
- Narrow authoritarian coalitions raise mobilization stakes and zero-sum perceptions among excluded groups. (similarity 0.81)
- Exclusionary authoritarian regimes cultivate zero-sum perceptions that outlast them and drive electoral violence (similarity 0.80)
- Lifting authoritarian repression explains only some post-transition ethnic violence. (similarity 0.79)
- African ruling coalitions nearly always include some ethno-regional intermediaries, but inclusion depth varies (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- Preventing ethnic dominance reduces electoral violence during democratic transitions
#corroborates(0.92) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 87 - Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk.
#expands(0.85) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 10 - Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk.
#expands(0.85) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 94 - Exclusionary versus cooperative elite coalition legacies shape post-transition electoral violence risk.
#expands(0.85) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 96 - Inclusive clientelist patronage across ethnic elites can dampen inter-ethnic rivalry
#complicates(0.75) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 75 - Shared state violence can create fellow feeling across ethnic lines.
#complicates(0.72) — Luke de Noronha, The conviviality of the overpoliced,…, 46