Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk.

Evidence

To understand the different outcomes, our analysis highlights how the regime in each country used varying strategies to forge ruling coalitions during authoritarian rule. While Kenya’s single-party rule contained a relatively exclusive approach, based on a narrow support-base and active suppression of those excluded from power, Zambia’s single-party rule was more inclusive, based on a broader ethnic support base and with deliberate efforts to counter ethnic divisions. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 94

Categorization

  • XREF: Connects directly to the reader’s threatened-privilege thesis: exclusive ruling coalitions create a threatened in-group whose loss of monopoly power readies them for electoral violence, i.e. the regime-type mechanism doing the work that pluralist-democracy theories attribute to electoral institutions. — connects to: Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not. — Johan BroschĂ© and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 4; Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. — Johan BroschĂ© and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 10; Electoral violence in ethnically divided societies erupts when elections become ethnic head counts. — Johan BroschĂ© and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 14 (+10 more)
  • DEFINE: Lays out the explanatory frame distinguishing inclusive from exclusive authoritarian coalition-building — the book’s core causal variable.

Broader Connections