Authoritarian regime stability ultimately rests on informal patronage networks brokered by ethnic elites

Evidence

Strategies to sustain ruling coalitions included the establishment of formal institutions, such as a strong regime party that could maintain a multi-ethnic support base through elections (e.g. Horowitz, 2000: 429). Most importantly, however, regimes rested on informal structures of patronage politics. At the top, regimes accommodated ethnic elites deemed central to their stability through the distribution of public offices and state resources (Arriola, 2013). These ethnic leaders, in turn, acted as brokers of patronage that could mobilize their own ethnic communities (Bayart, 1993; Bratton & van de Walle, 1994). The inter-elite bargains, thus, translated into societal stability through the ethnic intermediaries’ embeddedness in patron–client networks that extend through society as a whole (North, Wallis & Weingast, 2009; Roessler, 2016). — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 22

Categorization

• DEFINE: Clarifies how the ‘weak institutionalization’ variable of authoritarian regimes works — not the formal party, but informal ethnic broker patronage is the load-bearing mechanism.
• XREF: Connects to the threatened-privilege research: elite accommodation on one axis (ethnicity) defines the political landscape a privileged group later mobilizes against. — connects to: Patrimonial elites extend control through fictive kinship and patronage networks; Inclusive clientelist patronage across ethnic elites can dampen inter-ethnic rivalry — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 75; Authoritarian regimes vary in how inclusively they build ethnic ruling coalitions. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 28 (+6 more)

Related

• Inclusive clientelist patronage across ethnic elites can dampen inter-ethnic rivalry (similarity 0.84)
• Authoritarian regimes vary in how inclusively they build ethnic ruling coalitions. (similarity 0.81)
• Moi’s patronage politics deliberately heightened ethnic salience for regime survival (similarity 0.81)
• Inclusive authoritarian legacies reduce zero-sum ethnic politics during democratic transitions (similarity 0.81)
• Patronage-based ethnic mobilization fosters zero-sum perceptions and fragmented opposition. (similarity 0.80)
• African ruling coalitions nearly always include some ethno-regional intermediaries, but inclusion depth varies (similarity 0.79)
• Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.79)
• Authoritarian coalition-building approaches shape post-transition political incentives. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Patrimonial elites extend control through fictive kinship and patronage networks #expands (0.92)
• Moi’s patronage politics deliberately heightened ethnic salience for regime survival #exemplifies (0.90) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 51
• Inclusive clientelist patronage across ethnic elites can dampen inter-ethnic rivalry #qualifies (0.88) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 75
• Absorbing rival elites into the ruling bloc decapitates and neutralizes opposition #expands (0.85)
• Authoritarian regimes vary in how inclusively they build ethnic ruling coalitions. #expands (0.78) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 28
• Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. #expands (0.75) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 10
• Strong character-based needs drive opposition to authoritarian regimes #complicates (0.72)