Preventing ethnic dominance reduces electoral violence during democratic transitions
Evidence
Kaunda’s deliberate policy to prevent ethnic dominance – politically, economically, and socially – was essential in countering ethnically based electoral violence at the re-introduction of multiparty politics. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 87
Categorization
- XREF: Directly relevant to the threatened-privilege mechanism question — this is an inverse case: absence of a zero-sum ethnic threat structure as violence suppressant. — connects to: Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 10; Electoral violence in ethnically divided societies erupts when elections become ethnic head counts. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 14; Inclusive authoritarian legacies reduce zero-sum ethnic politics during democratic transitions — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 38 (+4 more)
- ADDENDUM: Connects to the ‘threatened-privilege’ reading purpose as a potential negative-case control: no mobilized privilege group formed here partly because no group’s dominance was entrenched.
Related
- Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.91)
- Inclusive authoritarian legacies reduce zero-sum ethnic politics during democratic transitions (similarity 0.90)
- Electoral violence in ethnically divided societies erupts when elections become ethnic head counts. (similarity 0.88)
- Authoritarian-rule legacies plausibly drive electoral violence beyond Africa (similarity 0.86)
- Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not. (similarity 0.86)
- Narrow authoritarian coalitions raise mobilization stakes and zero-sum perceptions among excluded groups. (similarity 0.85)
- Exclusionary authoritarian regimes cultivate zero-sum perceptions that outlast them and drive electoral violence (similarity 0.85)
- Authoritarian-era rhetoric norms constrain whether elites can later mobilize voters through ethnic hostility. (similarity 0.84)
- Authoritarian coalition-building approaches shape post-transition political incentives. (similarity 0.84)
- Exclusionary versus cooperative elite coalition legacies shape post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.84)
- Lifting authoritarian repression explains only some post-transition ethnic violence. (similarity 0.83)
- Authoritarian-era institutional choices can shape political behavior after democratic openings. (similarity 0.83)
- Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.83)
- Authoritarian regimes vary in how inclusively they build ethnic ruling coalitions. (similarity 0.80)
- Inclusive clientelist patronage across ethnic elites can dampen inter-ethnic rivalry (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- Exclusionary versus cooperative elite coalition legacies shape post-transition electoral violence risk.
#corroborates(0.85) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 96 - Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk.
#corroborates(0.80) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 94 - Exclusionary authoritarian regimes cultivate zero-sum perceptions that outlast them and drive electoral violence
#corroborates(0.78) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 98