Narrow authoritarian coalitions raise mobilization stakes and zero-sum perceptions among excluded groups.

Evidence

These processes were mirrored by similar countermobilization efforts from ethnic groups outside the ruling coalition (Wimmer, Cederman & Min, 2009). The competitiveness of the mobilization was higher with more exclusionary coalitions. The stakes increased with the number of groups excluded from power, fostering a perception of politics as a zero-sum game. More inclusionary coalition-building did not feed into competitive mobilization of ethnic groups in the same way. The shares of groups in the regime coalitions were larger, reducing ethnic elites’ political premium from marshalling their own constituents to signal strength. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 34

Categorization

• XREF: The zero-sum perception mechanism appears identical under both authoritarian exclusion and pluralist threatened privilege, supporting the generalizability the reader is testing. — connects to: Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 4; Authoritarian coalition-building approaches shape post-transition political incentives. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 30; Authoritarian regimes vary in how inclusively they build ethnic ruling coalitions. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 28 (+3 more)
• QUESTION: Does this reframe ‘threatened privilege’ as one instance of a broader ‘exclusion-fueled zero-sum’ mechanism rather than a distinct category?

Related

• Exclusionary authoritarian regimes cultivate zero-sum perceptions that outlast them and drive electoral violence (similarity 0.92)
• Inclusive authoritarian legacies reduce zero-sum ethnic politics during democratic transitions (similarity 0.90)
• Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.89)
• Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not. (similarity 0.88)
• Authoritarian coalition-building approaches shape post-transition political incentives. (similarity 0.86)
• Preventing ethnic dominance reduces electoral violence during democratic transitions (similarity 0.85)
• Authoritarian regimes vary in how inclusively they build ethnic ruling coalitions. (similarity 0.83)
• Patronage-based ethnic mobilization fosters zero-sum perceptions and fragmented opposition. (similarity 0.83)
• Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.83)
• Authoritarian-rule legacies plausibly drive electoral violence beyond Africa (similarity 0.83)
• Authoritarian-era rhetoric norms constrain whether elites can later mobilize voters through ethnic hostility. (similarity 0.82)
• Electoral violence in ethnically divided societies erupts when elections become ethnic head counts. (similarity 0.81)
• Lifting authoritarian repression explains only some post-transition ethnic violence. (similarity 0.80)
• African ruling coalitions nearly always include some ethno-regional intermediaries, but inclusion depth varies (similarity 0.80)
• Exclusionary versus cooperative elite coalition legacies shape post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Exclusionary authoritarian regimes cultivate zero-sum perceptions that outlast them and drive electoral violence #corroborates (0.85) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 98
• Patronage-based ethnic mobilization fosters zero-sum perceptions and fragmented opposition. #expands (0.80) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 58
• Inclusive authoritarian legacies reduce zero-sum ethnic politics during democratic transitions #complicates (0.78) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 38