Authoritarian-rule legacies plausibly drive electoral violence beyond Africa

Evidence

However, in other parts of the world electoral regimes face comparable challenges due to high social fragmentation and past authoritarian rule. Thus, the political dynamics created by prior governing strategies are also likely to be of consequence for electoral violence in unconsolidated regimes in the Middle East and Asia. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 104

Categorization

• QUESTION: Invites testing whether threatened-privilege mobilization replicates in Middle East and Asian hybrid/authoritarian-leaning regimes, extending the reader’s own research scope.
• XREF: connects to: Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 4; Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 94; Authoritarian-era coalition-building logics explain later divergence in electoral violence between Kenya and Zambia. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 95 (+4 more)

Related

• Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not. (similarity 0.90)
• Exclusionary authoritarian regimes cultivate zero-sum perceptions that outlast them and drive electoral violence (similarity 0.88)
• Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.88)
• Inclusive authoritarian legacies reduce zero-sum ethnic politics during democratic transitions (similarity 0.88)
• Authoritarian coalition-building approaches shape post-transition political incentives. (similarity 0.87)
• Exclusionary versus cooperative elite coalition legacies shape post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.87)
• Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.87)
• Authoritarian-era coalition-building logics explain later divergence in electoral violence between Kenya and Zambia. (similarity 0.87)
• Authoritarian-era rhetoric norms constrain whether elites can later mobilize voters through ethnic hostility. (similarity 0.86)
• Preventing ethnic dominance reduces electoral violence during democratic transitions (similarity 0.86)
• Authoritarian-era institutional choices can shape political behavior after democratic openings. (similarity 0.85)
• Authoritarian regimes vary in how inclusively they build ethnic ruling coalitions. (similarity 0.85)
• Electoral violence in ethnically divided societies erupts when elections become ethnic head counts. (similarity 0.84)
• African ruling coalitions nearly always include some ethno-regional intermediaries, but inclusion depth varies (similarity 0.83)
• Narrow authoritarian coalitions raise mobilization stakes and zero-sum perceptions among excluded groups. (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• Exclusionary versus cooperative elite coalition legacies shape post-transition electoral violence risk. #expands (0.85) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 96
• Inclusive authoritarian legacies reduce zero-sum ethnic politics during democratic transitions #corroborates (0.80) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 38
• Preventing ethnic dominance reduces electoral violence during democratic transitions #corroborates (0.75) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 87