Inclusive clientelist patronage across ethnic elites can dampen inter-ethnic rivalry

Evidence

Kaunda combined formal policies (like public spending on education) and informal neo-patrimonial interventions to uphold loyalties across ethno-political elites. These elites became part of a system where cooperation was sufficiently inclusive to foster integration (Burnell, 2005: 119). — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 75

Categorization

  • XREF: Relevant to threatened-privilege mechanism — inclusive neo-patrimonial co-optation is a plausible moderating counterforce to ethnic anxiety mobilization. — connects to: Electoral violence in ethnically divided societies erupts when elections become ethnic head counts. — Johan BroschĂ© and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 14; African ruling coalitions nearly always include some ethno-regional intermediaries, but inclusion depth varies — Johan BroschĂ© and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 23; Authoritarian regime stability ultimately rests on informal patronage networks brokered by ethnic elites — Johan BroschĂ© and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 22 (+8 more)

Broader Connections