Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not.

Evidence

This article places legacies from the authoritarian past at the core of an explanation of when democratic openings become associated with electoral violence in multi-ethnic states, and complement existing research focused on the immediate conditions surrounding the elections. We argue that authoritarian rule characterized by more exclusionary multiethnic coalitions creates legacies that amplify the risk of violent elections during the shift to multiparty politics. Through competitive and fragmented interethnic relations, exclusionary systems foreclose the forging of cross-ethnic elite coalitions and make hostile narratives a powerful tool for political mobilization. By contrast, regimes with a broad-based ethnic support base cultivate inclusive inter-elite bargaining, enable cross-ethnic coalitions, and reduce incentives for hostile ethnic mobilization, which lower the risk of violent elections. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 4

Categorization

• XREF: Directly speaks to the reader’s threatened-privilege hypothesis: it tests whether a zero-sum/exclusionary-coalition mechanism replicates across regime type, with Zambia as the mirror case where the same ethnic-divide conditions did NOT produce violence. Connects to the reader’s existing work on majority identity mobilization. — connects to: Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 94; Exclusionary authoritarian regimes cultivate zero-sum perceptions that outlast them and drive electoral violence — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 98; Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 10 (+6 more)

Related

• Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.95)
• Authoritarian coalition-building approaches shape post-transition political incentives. (similarity 0.92)
• Exclusionary versus cooperative elite coalition legacies shape post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.92)
• Inclusive authoritarian legacies reduce zero-sum ethnic politics during democratic transitions (similarity 0.91)
• Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.91)
• Authoritarian-era coalition-building logics explain later divergence in electoral violence between Kenya and Zambia. (similarity 0.91)
• Authoritarian-rule legacies plausibly drive electoral violence beyond Africa (similarity 0.90)
• Exclusionary authoritarian regimes cultivate zero-sum perceptions that outlast them and drive electoral violence (similarity 0.89)
• African ruling coalitions nearly always include some ethno-regional intermediaries, but inclusion depth varies (similarity 0.89)
• Authoritarian regimes vary in how inclusively they build ethnic ruling coalitions. (similarity 0.88)
• Narrow authoritarian coalitions raise mobilization stakes and zero-sum perceptions among excluded groups. (similarity 0.88)
• Authoritarian-era rhetoric norms constrain whether elites can later mobilize voters through ethnic hostility. (similarity 0.87)
• Preventing ethnic dominance reduces electoral violence during democratic transitions (similarity 0.86)
• Electoral violence in ethnically divided societies erupts when elections become ethnic head counts. (similarity 0.85)
• Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund — Electoral violence and the legacy of authoritarian rule in Kenya and Zambia (similarity 0.85)

Broader Connections

• Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk. #corroborates (0.92) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 94
• Exclusionary authoritarian regimes cultivate zero-sum perceptions that outlast them and drive electoral violence #expands (0.88) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 98
• Exclusionary versus cooperative elite coalition legacies shape post-transition electoral violence risk. #corroborates (0.85) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 96
• Narrow authoritarian coalitions raise mobilization stakes and zero-sum perceptions among excluded groups. #expands (0.82) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 34
• Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. #qualifies (0.80) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 10
• Authoritarian-era coalition-building logics explain later divergence in electoral violence between Kenya and Zambia. #exemplifies (0.78) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 95
• Authoritarian-rule legacies plausibly drive electoral violence beyond Africa #expands (0.72) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 104