Lifting authoritarian repression explains only some post-transition ethnic violence.

Evidence

Scholarship focusing more generally on regime characteristics and political violence primarily highlights the capacity of authoritarian regimes to repress dissent, including ethnic challengers (e.g. Muller & Weede, 1990). This literature posits that the potential for ethnic violence surged as democratic institutions placed significant constraints on the ability of regimes to coerce multi-ethnic populations into compliance (Mousseau, 2001; Saideman et al, 2002). Yet, the large variation in ethnic violence following the introduction of multiparty rule suggests that ‘removing the repressive lid’ provides only part of the story of how intergroup relations evolve from authoritarian rule to multiparty electoral competition. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 17

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reading purpose on threatened-privilege mobilization: this qualifies ‘removing the repressive lid’ as too simple, parallel to why zero-sum/threat mechanisms must be excavated beneath a purely repression-based account.

Related

• Preventing ethnic dominance reduces electoral violence during democratic transitions (similarity 0.83)
• Inclusive authoritarian legacies reduce zero-sum ethnic politics during democratic transitions (similarity 0.82)
• Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.82)
• Narrow authoritarian coalitions raise mobilization stakes and zero-sum perceptions among excluded groups. (similarity 0.80)
• Authoritarian-rule legacies plausibly drive electoral violence beyond Africa (similarity 0.80)
• Authoritarian-era institutional choices can shape political behavior after democratic openings. (similarity 0.79)
• Electoral violence in ethnically divided societies erupts when elections become ethnic head counts. (similarity 0.79)