Patronage-based ethnic mobilization fosters zero-sum perceptions and fragmented opposition.
Evidence
Partly, the fragmentation of the opposition was a consequence of Moi’s early strategy to channel patronage via powerful individuals serving as ethnic patrons to secure support. The approach had raised ethnic salience, fostered a perception of politics as zero-sum, and created strong center–locality relations where individual patrons had the capacity to mobilize mass support and deliver their ethnic constituencies (Cheeseman, 2006: 302–303). By being both wealthy and having an established ethnic support base, the main political leaders knew that ‘even if they suffered electoral defeat, the strength of their personal support would ensure that they continued to be major players in Kenya’s political landscape’ (Cheeseman, 2006: 303). — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 58
Categorization
- XREF: Directly extends the reader’s threatened-privilege research: here the regime engineered ethnic patronage to raise zero-sum perceptions — a top-down mechanism distinct from bottom-up status threat, a useful contrast case. — connects to: Narrow authoritarian coalitions raise mobilization stakes and zero-sum perceptions among excluded groups. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 34; Moi’s patronage politics deliberately heightened ethnic salience for regime survival — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 51; Inclusive clientelist patronage across ethnic elites can dampen inter-ethnic rivalry — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 75 (+5 more)
- QUESTION: Does this patronage-induced zero-sum perception precede or substitute for threatened-privilege status threat among the ethnic majority — a different mobilization logic worth disentangling.
Related
- Moi’s patronage politics deliberately heightened ethnic salience for regime survival (similarity 0.86)
- Narrow authoritarian coalitions raise mobilization stakes and zero-sum perceptions among excluded groups. (similarity 0.83)
- Authoritarian regime stability ultimately rests on informal patronage networks brokered by ethnic elites (similarity 0.80)
- Ethnic outbidding by Sinhalese parties drove ethnic polarization. (similarity 0.79)
- Inclusive authoritarian legacies reduce zero-sum ethnic politics during democratic transitions (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- Inclusive clientelist patronage across ethnic elites can dampen inter-ethnic rivalry
#contradicts(0.90) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 75 - Exclusionary authoritarian regimes cultivate zero-sum perceptions that outlast them and drive electoral violence
#corroborates(0.85) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 98 - Zero-sum competition over resources produces ethnocentrism and intergroup hostility
#corroborates(0.80) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 136 - Ethnic parties shift toward moderation only after securing dominance over in-group rivals
#expands(0.70) — Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Roger Macginty, Ethnic Outbidding and Party…, 103