Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control

Evidence

The core notion of the theory put forward in the target article is that of partner choice, a notion which is perhaps best understood when contrasted to that of partner control. In partner-control models, such as the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, individuals cannot choose their partners: They are stuck with a given partner, and they can only either cooperate with this partner or defect, thereby losing all the benefits of the interaction. We argued that fairness is unlikely to have evolved in such a constrained environment since the least powerful partner in the interaction has no choice but to accept offers, even the most unfair ones. By contrast, in partner-choice models, individuals can choose their partners. The least powerful partner therefore always has the option to refuse being exploited and to look for more generous partners. In the end, since individuals have equal outside options, the evolutionary stable strategy is to share the benefits of cooperation impartially. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 610

In conclusion, mutualistic models of cooperation based on partner control only (e.g., Axelrod & Hamilton 1981) are unable to generate quantitative predictions regarding the way mutually beneficial cooperation should take place. In contrast, mutualistic models accounting explicitly for the unsatisfied individuals’ option of changing partners (André & Baumard 2011a) show that cooperative interactions can only take a very specific form that has all the distinctive features of fairness, defined as mutual advantage or impartiality. Individuals should be rewarded in exact proportion to the effort they invest in each interaction, and as a function of the quality and rarity of their skills; otherwise, they are better off interacting with other partners. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 51

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the partner-choice versus partner-control distinction that anchors the mutualistic theory of fairness.
• XREF: Connects directly to the reader’s stated reading frame: the fumi-e as a state attempt to destroy partner choice via public apostasy. — connects to: Morality evolved because fair partners were preferred in cooperative interactions — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 4; Partner choice deters cheating without anyone intending to punish — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 29; Morality may have evolved via partner choice over partner control — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 347 (+15 more)
• ADDENDUM: Supports ‘On Sacrifice’ by giving the evolutionary-mechanism account of why public shunning/apostasy is so destructive to cooperation.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 610; Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 51

Related

• Fairness is not reducible to mutualistic partner choice. (similarity 0.92)
• Partner choice predicts fair cooperation while group selection predicts utilitarian cooperation. (similarity 0.91)
• Fairness emerges when partner choice links each interaction to outside opportunities. (similarity 0.90)
• Fairness evolved to distribute payoffs by input, not equally. (similarity 0.90)
• Morality may have evolved via partner choice over partner control (similarity 0.89)
• Morality evolved because fair partners were preferred in cooperative interactions (similarity 0.89)
• Morality evolves from individual partner-choice competition, not group selection. (similarity 0.89)
• Meritocratic fairness norms evolved as adaptations to partner-choice markets (similarity 0.88)
• A disposition to fairness can evolve even when unshared, unlike a disposition to cooperate. (similarity 0.88)
• Fairness evolved as a psychological device because outside market options constrain benefit distribution. (similarity 0.88)
• Partner choice theory shifts cooperation research away from dyadic Prisoner’s Dilemma models. (similarity 0.87)
• Fairness equilibria require group-selection processes beyond partner choice alone. (similarity 0.87)
• A preference for fairness can directly favor equalitarianism in cooperation. (similarity 0.87)
• Partner choice selects among folk-theorem equilibria just as group selection does. (similarity 0.87)
• Fairness is self-interested because stingy partners get abandoned. (similarity 0.87)

Broader Connections

• Meritocratic fairness norms evolved as adaptations to partner-choice markets #corroborates (1.00) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 324
• Fairness emerges when partner choice links each interaction to outside opportunities. #corroborates (0.95) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 45
• Fairness equilibria require group-selection processes beyond partner choice alone. #contradicts (0.90) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 253
• Partner choice predicts fair cooperation while group selection predicts utilitarian cooperation. #expands (0.85) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 637
• Cooperation outcomes depend on partner choice frequency, not rule fairness. #qualifies (0.80) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 257