Competition for partners drives costly reputation-building cooperation.

Evidence

Competitive altruism is based on three assumptions: (1) that individuals differ in quality as potential partners; (2) that public behaviour provides a reliable guide to another individual’s future behaviour; and (3) that individuals pair up through mutual partner choice. From these assumptions, the theory infers that assortative partner choice will drive competition to be seen as a desirable partner. … Evidence now shows that a strategy of investing in a cooperative reputation can indeed reap rewards, in that the highest contributors to a public goods game obtain the most profitable subsequent partnerships (Sylwester & Roberts 2010). — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 531

Categorization

• XREF: Connects directly to the reading purpose: the fumi-e ritual destroys partner choice by disrupting the reliability of public behaviour as a signal of future conduct. — connects to: Cooperative relationships require asymmetric giving at their outset — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 341; Cooperative behavior is partly motivated by reputation concerns. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 311; Natural variation among partners drives selection toward greater cooperation. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 619 (+5 more)

Related

• Cooperative behavior is partly motivated by reputation concerns. (similarity 0.85)
• Reputation and anticipated repeat interactions drive stranger cooperation from the first round. (similarity 0.84)
• Morality evolved because fair partners were preferred in cooperative interactions (similarity 0.84)
• Natural variation among partners drives selection toward greater cooperation. (similarity 0.83)
• Competitive altruism permits unconditional giving rather than matched reciprocity (similarity 0.83)
• Cooperation outcomes depend on partner choice frequency, not rule fairness. (similarity 0.82)
• Fairness is not reducible to mutualistic partner choice. (similarity 0.82)
• Cooperation collapses once the threat of reputation-based punishment is removed. (similarity 0.82)
• Partner selection produces genuine moral feelings, not just narrow self-interested cooperation. (similarity 0.82)
• Morality evolves from individual partner-choice competition, not group selection. (similarity 0.82)
• Moral behavior shifts with the market supply and demand of cooperative partners (similarity 0.82)
• Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control (similarity 0.81)
• Partner choice predicts fair cooperation while group selection predicts utilitarian cooperation. (similarity 0.81)
• Altruistic cooperators still choose partners they trust and cooperate only where reciprocation is possible. (similarity 0.81)
• Competitive signalling may drive moral conduct beyond mere fairness. (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• Cooperative behavior is partly motivated by reputation concerns. #corroborates (0.85) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 311
• Larger groups make cooperation harder to establish because reputational information spreads more thinly. #complicates (0.80) — Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K, Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by…, 72
• Natural variation among partners drives selection toward greater cooperation. #corroborates (0.75) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 619