Equality-as-salient-point cannot explain unequal fair distributions

Evidence

DeScioli also mentions Thomas Schelling’s well-known idea of salient coordination points. Could fairness, as DeScioli suggests, simply emerge as such a salient point in a game of coordination? Equality can be a salient point for simple cognitive reasons (a pair of equal quantities stands out among various pairs of unequal quantities). Not all fair distributions, however, are equal; when contributions are unequal, so are fair distributions. Then, either the relevant salient point is equality, and unequal fair distributions are not explained in terms of salient points; or else fair splits are always salient – but, if so, presumably they are salient because they are fair and people care for fairness, rather than the other way around. This, of course, leaves wholly unexplained the existence, evolution, and role of fairness. It is partner choice, we have argued, that explains why humans tend to coordinate on fair splits, leaving open the possibility that saliency plays a role in explaining the how. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 615

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s analytical framework on partner choice (Baumard et al.) versus mere coordination saliency — directly relevant to the fumi-e argument. — connects to: Shared fairness intuitions cannot explain distributive variability when beliefs and situations are held constant. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 326; People disagree persistently about what makes inequality fair — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 325; Fairness evolved to distribute payoffs by input, not equally. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 310

Related

• Shared fairness intuitions cannot explain distributive variability when beliefs and situations are held constant. (similarity 0.89)
• Fairness evolved to distribute payoffs by input, not equally. (similarity 0.87)
• People disagree persistently about what makes inequality fair (similarity 0.87)
• Fairness is not reducible to mutualistic partner choice. (similarity 0.85)
• A preference for fairness can directly favor equalitarianism in cooperation. (similarity 0.84)
• Fairness equilibria require group-selection processes beyond partner choice alone. (similarity 0.83)
• Fairness distributions reflect bargaining power, not just effort. (similarity 0.83)
• Fairness judgments track each participant’s earned contribution, not just payoff equality. (similarity 0.82)
• Fairness rests on impartiality, not mutualistic cooperation. (similarity 0.82)
• Fairness emerges when partner choice links each interaction to outside opportunities. (similarity 0.82)
• Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control (similarity 0.82)
• Seemingly fair outcomes can arise from self-referent loss aversion rather than fairness preferences. (similarity 0.81)
• Deriving fairness from bargaining power threatens to reduce moral norms to mere bargaining. (similarity 0.81)
• Partner choice selects among folk-theorem equilibria just as group selection does. (similarity 0.81)
• A disposition to fairness can evolve even when unshared, unlike a disposition to cooperate. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Shared fairness intuitions cannot explain distributive variability when beliefs and situations are held constant. #corroborates (0.85) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 326
• Fairness evolved to distribute payoffs by input, not equally. #contradicts (0.75) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 310
• People disagree persistently about what makes inequality fair #complicates (0.70) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 325