Fairness evolved to distribute payoffs by input, not equally.

Evidence

Baumard et al. propose that strong social selection based on partner choice in an environment in which mutual helping is highly advantageous led to the evolution of a self-serving sense of fairness in humans. Importantly, fairness preferences do not necessarily lead to equal outcomes but, instead, to payoffs that are distributed according to relative input, where rare abilities may yield particularly high shares. This view supports the market law of supply and demand: Fair payoff distributions mean that switching to another partner will not yield an average higher payoff. An individual with a sense of fairness is both an attractive and a vigilant partner: sharing with cooperating individuals but responding aversively to cheating individuals. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 310

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s analytical frame: this is the partner-choice mechanism the Japanese fumi-e ritual is designed to destroy, per the reading purpose. — connects to: Human fairness means overriding merit to aid the needy. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 591; Equality-as-salient-point cannot explain unequal fair distributions — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 615; Fairness in cooperation requires outside options, not contribution. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 44 (+6 more)
• DEFINE: Clarifies that the evolved fairness sense is proportional-payoff-based, not egalitarian — a crucial distinction.

Related

• Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control (similarity 0.90)
• Fairness evolved as a psychological device because outside market options constrain benefit distribution. (similarity 0.90)
• A preference for fairness can directly favor equalitarianism in cooperation. (similarity 0.90)
• Fairness is not reducible to mutualistic partner choice. (similarity 0.89)
• A disposition to fairness can evolve even when unshared, unlike a disposition to cooperate. (similarity 0.89)
• Meritocratic fairness norms evolved as adaptations to partner-choice markets (similarity 0.88)
• Fairness emerges when partner choice links each interaction to outside opportunities. (similarity 0.88)
• Fairness equilibria require group-selection processes beyond partner choice alone. (similarity 0.88)
• Equality-as-salient-point cannot explain unequal fair distributions (similarity 0.87)
• Deriving fairness from bargaining power threatens to reduce moral norms to mere bargaining. (similarity 0.87)
• Fairness judgments track each participant’s earned contribution, not just payoff equality. (similarity 0.87)
• Morality evolved because fair partners were preferred in cooperative interactions (similarity 0.86)
• Humans pervasively prefer meritocratic benefit distributions. (similarity 0.86)
• Shared fairness intuitions cannot explain distributive variability when beliefs and situations are held constant. (similarity 0.86)
• Morality evolved as a propensity for fair cost-benefit sharing among cooperators. (similarity 0.85)

Broader Connections

• Meritocratic fairness norms evolved as adaptations to partner-choice markets #corroborates (0.90) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 324
• Fairness in economic games tracks perceived entitlement rather than raw contribution. #corroborates (0.85) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 467
• Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control #expands (0.80) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 610