Fairness distributions reflect bargaining power, not just effort.

Evidence

Notice, however, that, strictly speaking, bargaining theory offers a unifying account of partner-choice and partner-control models under the general principle that negotiated distributions of resources reflect relative bargaining power. Power, in turn, is measured by the difference between individuals’ negotiated payoffs and the payoff they would obtain if bargaining broke down (their outside options). The general theory helps one appreciate that effort and talent are only two factors among those that determine an individual’s bargaining power. The availability of alternative partners is another factor, but so are physical strength (the capacity to offend or coerce), accumulated wealth, membership in a coalition, and so forth. Baumard et al.’s market for partners effectively abstracts away from such factors and focuses on effort and talent only. This may be a good approximation to the ancestral environment where fairness norms initially evolved, but need not be true of many other ecological and social niches created by homo sapiens since then. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 443

Categorization

• DEEPTHINKING: Unifies two competing models under a single bargaining-power principle and then points out the market abstraction fails outside ancestral niches — dense theoretical move worth sitting with.
• XREF: Directly feeds the reader’s integrating project on Father Rodrigues / fumi-e: the fumi-e trampling is precisely a destruction of an outside option and bargaining power, not merely a norm violation. — connects to: Deriving fairness from bargaining power threatens to reduce moral norms to mere bargaining. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 623; In bargaining, seeming weakness can convert into strategic strength. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 130; Fairness rests on impartiality, not mutualistic cooperation. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 563 (+7 more)

Related

• Deriving fairness from bargaining power threatens to reduce moral norms to mere bargaining. (similarity 0.90)
• Fairness emerges when partner choice links each interaction to outside opportunities. (similarity 0.84)
• Fairness evolved to distribute payoffs by input, not equally. (similarity 0.84)
• Meritocratic fairness norms evolved as adaptations to partner-choice markets (similarity 0.84)
• Fairness rests on impartiality, not mutualistic cooperation. (similarity 0.83)
• Fairness is not reducible to mutualistic partner choice. (similarity 0.83)
• Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control (similarity 0.83)
• Equality-as-salient-point cannot explain unequal fair distributions (similarity 0.83)
• Shared fairness intuitions cannot explain distributive variability when beliefs and situations are held constant. (similarity 0.82)
• Fairness is self-interested because stingy partners get abandoned. (similarity 0.82)
• Fairness evolved as a psychological device because outside market options constrain benefit distribution. (similarity 0.82)
• Talented individuals merit larger shares because their outside options are stronger. (similarity 0.81)
• Fairness judgments track each participant’s earned contribution, not just payoff equality. (similarity 0.81)
• A disposition to fairness can evolve even when unshared, unlike a disposition to cooperate. (similarity 0.80)
• A preference for fairness can directly favor equalitarianism in cooperation. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Deriving fairness from bargaining power threatens to reduce moral norms to mere bargaining. #complicates (0.85) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 623
• Bargaining outcomes rest on convergent reflexive expectations, not on force or merit #contradicts (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 177
• Fairness rests on impartiality, not mutualistic cooperation. #complicates (0.80) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 563
• In bargaining, seeming weakness can convert into strategic strength. #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 130