Fairness equilibria require group-selection processes beyond partner choice alone.
Evidence
Baumard et al. neglect frequency-dependent processes exemplified by games of coordination. Such games can produce multiple equilibria that may or may not include fair outcomes. Additional, group-selection processes are required to produce the outcomes predicted by the models. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 253
Categorization
- QUESTION: If coordination games yield multiple equilibria including unfair ones, what actually tips a society into the fair equilibrium — and what would the fumi-e ritual tip a Japanese Catholic community toward?
- ADDENDUM: Supports the ‘On Sacrifice’ argument that ritual and destructive public displays stabilize specific social equilibria — here, forced apostasy as a coordination-game shift.
- XREF: connects to: Fairness is not reducible to mutualistic partner choice. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 567; Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 610; Partner choice selects among folk-theorem equilibria just as group selection does. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 636 (+4 more)
Related
- Fairness is not reducible to mutualistic partner choice. (similarity 0.90)
- Fairness emerges when partner choice links each interaction to outside opportunities. (similarity 0.89)
- Fairness evolved to distribute payoffs by input, not equally. (similarity 0.88)
- Partner choice selects among folk-theorem equilibria just as group selection does. (similarity 0.88)
- Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control (similarity 0.87)
- Partner choice predicts fair cooperation while group selection predicts utilitarian cooperation. (similarity 0.86)
- Fairness evolved as a psychological device because outside market options constrain benefit distribution. (similarity 0.85)
- A preference for fairness can directly favor equalitarianism in cooperation. (similarity 0.85)
- Fairness in cooperation requires outside options, not contribution. (similarity 0.84)
- Morality evolved because fair partners were preferred in cooperative interactions (similarity 0.84)
- Fairness rests on impartiality, not mutualistic cooperation. (similarity 0.84)
- Cooperation outcomes depend on partner choice frequency, not rule fairness. (similarity 0.83)
- Meritocratic fairness norms evolved as adaptations to partner-choice markets (similarity 0.83)
- Equality-as-salient-point cannot explain unequal fair distributions (similarity 0.83)
- Morality evolves from individual partner-choice competition, not group selection. (similarity 0.83)
Broader Connections
- Meritocratic fairness norms evolved as adaptations to partner-choice markets
#complicates(0.85) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 324 - Partner choice predicts fair cooperation while group selection predicts utilitarian cooperation.
#qualifies(0.85) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 637 - Cooperation outcomes depend on partner choice frequency, not rule fairness.
#contradicts(0.80) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 257