Cooperation outcomes depend on partner choice frequency, not rule fairness.

Evidence

The stag hunt parable is the classic example where partner choice might facilitate cooperative outcomes. Stag hunting is a cooperative effort that requires a group of hunters because no one can take a stag alone. Hares, however, can be taken alone. The per capita returns from stag hunting are greater than those from hare hunting, and, of course, killing a hare is better than obtaining nothing – which is what one will get if one’s partner goes for a hare. Hunters might be expected to select partners who will follow the one basic rule: Go for the stag, do not be tempted by the hare – unless of course, hare hunting is the norm. Solutions are frequency dependent. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 257

Categorization

• XREF: Connects directly to the reader’s frame: fumi-e apostasy as a coordination sabotage — the Japanese authorities suppress stag-hunt cooperation by making hare-hunting (apostasy) the visible norm. — connects to: Cooperation arises from partner choice, not reciprocal tit-for-tat, across species and human development. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 593; Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 610; Fairness in cooperation requires outside options, not contribution. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 44 (+7 more)
• DEFINE: Clarifies the stag hunt as a coordination game where partner choice, not punishment, drives cooperation — distinct from the PD framing.

Related

• Fairness in cooperation requires outside options, not contribution. (similarity 0.83)
• Fairness equilibria require group-selection processes beyond partner choice alone. (similarity 0.83)
• Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control (similarity 0.83)
• Competition for partners drives costly reputation-building cooperation. (similarity 0.82)
• Fairness is not reducible to mutualistic partner choice. (similarity 0.82)
• Cooperative ventures are exchanges proportional to each partner’s contribution. (similarity 0.82)
• Partner choice theory shifts cooperation research away from dyadic Prisoner’s Dilemma models. (similarity 0.82)
• Fairness emerges when partner choice links each interaction to outside opportunities. (similarity 0.82)
• Fairness is self-interested because stingy partners get abandoned. (similarity 0.82)
• Partner choice predicts fair cooperation while group selection predicts utilitarian cooperation. (similarity 0.82)
• Cooperation arises from partner choice, not reciprocal tit-for-tat, across species and human development. (similarity 0.81)
• A preference for fairness can directly favor equalitarianism in cooperation. (similarity 0.80)
• Morality evolved because fair partners were preferred in cooperative interactions (similarity 0.80)
• Cooperation can be sustained by partner exclusion rather than by punitive coercion. (similarity 0.80)
• Partner choice selects among folk-theorem equilibria just as group selection does. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Morality evolves from individual partner-choice competition, not group selection. #corroborates (0.80) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 605
• Cooperation-focused strategies fail where conditions for cooperation are themselves absent #corroborates (0.78)
• Cooperation can occur without trust when incentives align #qualifies (0.72)
• Cooperation can operate independently of trust #qualifies (0.70)