Partner choice deters cheating without anyone intending to punish
Evidence
In partner-choice models, the purpose of switching to another partner is not to inflict a cost on the cheater and thereby punish him. It need not matter to the switcher whether or not the cheater suffers as a consequence. A client fish switching partners is indifferent to the fate of the cleaner it leaves behind. All it wants in switching partners is to benefit from the services of a better cleaner. Still, cheating is generally made costly by the loss of opportunities to cooperate at all, and this may well have a dissuasive effect and contribute to stabilize cooperation. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 29
Categorization
- XREF: Directly connects to the reader’s stated purpose: the fumi-e ritual works by destroying partner choice (Baumard et al.) rather than by inflicting punishment — the mechanism is exit from cooperation, not retribution. — connects to: Cooperation is stabilized either by punishing cheaters or by exiting to new partners. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 28; Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 610; Morality may have evolved via partner choice over partner control — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 347 (+5 more)
Related
- Cooperation is stabilized either by punishing cheaters or by exiting to new partners. (similarity 0.89)
- Morality may have evolved via partner choice over partner control (similarity 0.87)
- Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control (similarity 0.86)
- Partner choice selects among folk-theorem equilibria just as group selection does. (similarity 0.84)
- Peer exclusion deters cheating where binding legal institutions are absent. (similarity 0.84)
- Partner choice theory shifts cooperation research away from dyadic Prisoner’s Dilemma models. (similarity 0.84)
- Morality evolves from individual partner-choice competition, not group selection. (similarity 0.84)
- Fairness is not reducible to mutualistic partner choice. (similarity 0.83)
- Morality evolved because fair partners were preferred in cooperative interactions (similarity 0.82)
- A partner-choice account of morality predicts avoidant emotions dominate moral life (similarity 0.82)
- Partner choice predicts fair cooperation while group selection predicts utilitarian cooperation. (similarity 0.82)
- Partner selection produces genuine moral feelings, not just narrow self-interested cooperation. (similarity 0.81)
- Moral conduct serves as a costly signal that pays in partner selection. (similarity 0.80)
- Genuinely moral partners signal higher reliability than strategically moral ones. (similarity 0.80)
- Fairness emerges when partner choice links each interaction to outside opportunities. (similarity 0.80)
Broader Connections
- Morality may have evolved via partner choice over partner control
#corroborates(0.92) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 347 - Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control
#corroborates(0.90) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 610 - Morality evolves from individual partner-choice competition, not group selection.
#corroborates(0.85) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 605 - A continuing relationship functions as a forfeitable bond against cheating.
#expands(0.82) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 2 - Partner choice selects among folk-theorem equilibria just as group selection does.
#expands(0.75) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 636