Shared fairness intuitions cannot explain distributive variability when beliefs and situations are held constant.

Evidence

In contrast, the mutualistic hypothesis posits that humans are all equipped with the same sense of fairness. Baumard et al. argue that people may still distribute resources differently for two reasons: First, people do not necessarily have the same beliefs about the source of an inequality; second, people do not necessarily face the same distributive situations (and a fairness view may have different implications in different situations). We agree that these two reasons potentially can explain much interindividual and cross-cultural variability in distributive behavior, but they cannot explain the behavioral variability observed in the economic experiments described above. These experiments are designed so that all participants have the same, and correct, beliefs about the sources of inequalities in earnings and all participants face the same distributive situations. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 326

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s interest in Baumard et al. partner-choice theory and the fumi-e analysis in the reading purpose. — connects to: Equality-as-salient-point cannot explain unequal fair distributions — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 615; Seemingly fair outcomes can arise from self-referent loss aversion rather than fairness preferences. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 312; Fairness in economic games tracks perceived entitlement rather than raw contribution. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 467 (+2 more)
• QUESTION: If mutualism can’t explain variability under controlled conditions, what additional mechanism must Baumard et al. invoke?

Related

• Equality-as-salient-point cannot explain unequal fair distributions (similarity 0.89)
• People disagree persistently about what makes inequality fair (similarity 0.88)
• Fairness evolved to distribute payoffs by input, not equally. (similarity 0.86)
• Seemingly fair outcomes can arise from self-referent loss aversion rather than fairness preferences. (similarity 0.85)
• Fairness judgments track each participant’s earned contribution, not just payoff equality. (similarity 0.85)
• Fairness is not reducible to mutualistic partner choice. (similarity 0.82)
• A preference for fairness can directly favor equalitarianism in cooperation. (similarity 0.82)
• Fairness distributions reflect bargaining power, not just effort. (similarity 0.82)
• Fairness in economic games tracks perceived entitlement rather than raw contribution. (similarity 0.82)
• Humans pervasively prefer meritocratic benefit distributions. (similarity 0.82)
• Earned entitlements reshape perceived fairness in resource division. (similarity 0.82)
• Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control (similarity 0.81)
• Deriving fairness from bargaining power threatens to reduce moral norms to mere bargaining. (similarity 0.80)
• Fairness rests on impartiality, not mutualistic cooperation. (similarity 0.80)
• Fairness emerges when partner choice links each interaction to outside opportunities. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Fairness in economic games tracks perceived entitlement rather than raw contribution. #complicates (0.80) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 467