Partner choice selects among folk-theorem equilibria just as group selection does.
Evidence
In our framework, group selection is not necessary to explain the existence of human morality. Indeed, group selection, at least in its latest form (see Boyd et al. for a recent review), is presented as a mechanism to select among the multiple equilibria entailed by the folk theorem. As we have argued in section R2.2 above, partner choice can select among equilibria just as well. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 636
Categorization
- DEFINE: Clarifies what group selection actually does in its modern formulation — a mechanism for choosing among multiple equilibria — which is a precise technical point often blurred.
- XREF: connects to: Partner choice deters cheating without anyone intending to punish — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 29; Partner choice predicts fair cooperation while group selection predicts utilitarian cooperation. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 637; Fairness equilibria require group-selection processes beyond partner choice alone. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 253 (+1 more)
Related
- Partner choice predicts fair cooperation while group selection predicts utilitarian cooperation. (similarity 0.93)
- Morality evolves from individual partner-choice competition, not group selection. (similarity 0.89)
- Fairness is not reducible to mutualistic partner choice. (similarity 0.88)
- Fairness equilibria require group-selection processes beyond partner choice alone. (similarity 0.88)
- Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control (similarity 0.87)
- Morality may have evolved via partner choice over partner control (similarity 0.87)
- Fairness emerges when partner choice links each interaction to outside opportunities. (similarity 0.85)
- Partner choice deters cheating without anyone intending to punish (similarity 0.84)
- Meritocratic fairness norms evolved as adaptations to partner-choice markets (similarity 0.84)
- Partner selection produces genuine moral feelings, not just narrow self-interested cooperation. (similarity 0.84)
- Partner choice theory shifts cooperation research away from dyadic Prisoner’s Dilemma models. (similarity 0.83)
- Fairness is self-interested because stingy partners get abandoned. (similarity 0.83)
- A preference for fairness can directly favor equalitarianism in cooperation. (similarity 0.82)
- Partner-choice cooperation theory does not explain the intrinsic moral sense. (similarity 0.82)
- Fairness evolved to distribute payoffs by input, not equally. (similarity 0.82)
Broader Connections
- Fairness equilibria require group-selection processes beyond partner choice alone.
#complicates(0.85) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 253 - Fairness emerges when partner choice links each interaction to outside opportunities.
#corroborates(0.82) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 45