The underdetermination of partner-control models explains moral diversity, not failure.
Evidence
Notice that seen in this light the alleged weakness of partnercontrol models – their underdetermination – may turn out to be a strength: Repeated interactions can give rise to very different social institutions, depending on the underlying asymmetries of bargaining power (Binmore 2005). Such a perspective may be disturbing for those who believe in a core of evolved, stable, universal moral dispositions. On the other hand, it works as a recipe against complacency, and as an invitation to vigilance, for all those who endorse mutualistic fairness while recognizing its historical contingency, cultural relativity, and inherent fragility. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 450
Categorization
- XREF: Directly mirrors the fumi-e mechanism: the Japanese authorities weaponize bargaining-power asymmetries to flip which social institution the repeated interaction sustains — moral fragility as leverage. — connects to: Market models explain why moral standards vary across contexts, groups, and individuals. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 400; Cooperation has no single solution; motivations combine and overdetermine action; Generalized reciprocity cannot be explained by partner-control mechanisms. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 75 (+1 more)
Related
- Market models explain why moral standards vary across contexts, groups, and individuals. (similarity 0.85)
- Partner choice theory shifts cooperation research away from dyadic Prisoner’s Dilemma models. (similarity 0.83)
- Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control (similarity 0.80)
- Morality evolves from individual partner-choice competition, not group selection. (similarity 0.80)
- Morality may have evolved via partner choice over partner control (similarity 0.80)
- Moral norms differ by relationship type, not by one universal strategy. (similarity 0.80)
- Morality evolved because fair partners were preferred in cooperative interactions (similarity 0.79)
- Generalized reciprocity cannot be explained by partner-control mechanisms. (similarity 0.79)
- A disposition to fairness can evolve even when unshared, unlike a disposition to cooperate. (similarity 0.79)
- Postulating an innate moral preference fails to explain the missing-contract puzzle mechanistically. (similarity 0.79)
- Fairness distributions reflect bargaining power, not just effort. (similarity 0.79)
- Fairness is not reducible to mutualistic partner choice. (similarity 0.79)
- Fairness emerges when partner choice links each interaction to outside opportunities. (similarity 0.79)
- Partner-choice cooperation theory does not explain the intrinsic moral sense. (similarity 0.78)
- Fairness is self-interested because stingy partners get abandoned. (similarity 0.78)