A preference for fairness can directly favor equalitarianism in cooperation.
Evidence
If, however, humansā evolved sense of fairness is a proximal mechanism for social selection of desirable partners, then it can be given a more precise content that directly implies or at least favors equalitarianism in speciļ¬c conditions. Given the choice to participate in a game with either an equal distribution of initial resources, or a random unequal distribution, most people being rationally risk-adverse, would, everything else being equal, choose the game with an equal distribution (except in special circumstances; for instance, if this initial inequality provided a few of the partners with the means to invest important resources in a way that would end up being beneļ¬cial to all). Forced to play a game with an unequal and random allocation of initial resources but given the opportunity to choose their partners, most people would prefer partners whose behavior would diminish the inequality of the initial distribution. Being disposed to reduce inequality in such conditions is a desirable trait in cooperation partners. Hence, fairness deļ¬ned in terms of mutual advantage or impartiality may, in appropriate conditions, directly favor equalitarianism. ā Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 186
Categorization
- XREF: Connects to the readerās Big God / partner-choice frame ā this is the Baumard et al. mutualistic mechanism that the fumi-e scene weaponizes against. ā connects to: People punish free-riders partly to correct inequality, not only to enforce cooperation. ā Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: Theā¦, 184; Morality evolved because fair partners were preferred in cooperative interactions ā Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: Theā¦, 4
- DEFINE: Defines how fairness, when given the precise content of mutual advantage, implies equalitarianism under risk-aversion.
Related
- Fairness evolved to distribute payoffs by input, not equally. (similarity 0.90)
- Fairness is not reducible to mutualistic partner choice. (similarity 0.89)
- Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control (similarity 0.87)
- Fairness rests on impartiality, not mutualistic cooperation. (similarity 0.87)
- Morality evolved because fair partners were preferred in cooperative interactions (similarity 0.86)
- Morality evolved as a propensity for fair cost-benefit sharing among cooperators. (similarity 0.86)
- Partner choice predicts fair cooperation while group selection predicts utilitarian cooperation. (similarity 0.85)
- Fairness is self-interested because stingy partners get abandoned. (similarity 0.85)
- A disposition to fairness can evolve even when unshared, unlike a disposition to cooperate. (similarity 0.85)
- Meritocratic fairness norms evolved as adaptations to partner-choice markets (similarity 0.85)
- Fairness emerges when partner choice links each interaction to outside opportunities. (similarity 0.85)
- Fairness equilibria require group-selection processes beyond partner choice alone. (similarity 0.85)
- Morality is about fair cooperation, not maximizing welfare. (similarity 0.84)
- Morality evolves from individual partner-choice competition, not group selection. (similarity 0.84)
- Fairness evolved as a psychological device because outside market options constrain benefit distribution. (similarity 0.84)
Broader Connections
- Morality evolved because fair partners were preferred in cooperative interactions
#corroborates(0.75) ā Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 4