Meritocratic fairness norms evolved as adaptations to partner-choice markets

Evidence

The authors argue that the observed prominence in many distributive situations of the meritocratic fairness view, where individuals share the benefits from cooperation in proportion to the effort and talent they invest in the interaction, is the result of adaption to such a process of partner choice. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 324

Categorization

• DEFINE: Explains the meritocratic fairness view as sharing benefits in proportion to effort and talent invested.
• XREF: Connects to Baumard et al.’s partner choice theory and the moral-enforcement economy underlying the reader’s reading of Rodrigues. — connects to: Morality evolved because fair partners were preferred in cooperative interactions — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 4; Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 610; Partner choice predicts fair cooperation while group selection predicts utilitarian cooperation. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 637 (+9 more)

Related

• Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control (similarity 0.88)
• Fairness evolved to distribute payoffs by input, not equally. (similarity 0.88)
• Morality evolved because fair partners were preferred in cooperative interactions (similarity 0.88)
• Fairness evolved as a psychological device because outside market options constrain benefit distribution. (similarity 0.88)
• Partner choice predicts fair cooperation while group selection predicts utilitarian cooperation. (similarity 0.87)
• Fairness emerges when partner choice links each interaction to outside opportunities. (similarity 0.87)
• Morality evolves from individual partner-choice competition, not group selection. (similarity 0.86)
• Morality may have evolved via partner choice over partner control (similarity 0.86)
• Morality evolved as a propensity for fair cost-benefit sharing among cooperators. (similarity 0.85)
• A preference for fairness can directly favor equalitarianism in cooperation. (similarity 0.85)
• Fairness is not reducible to mutualistic partner choice. (similarity 0.84)
• Partner choice selects among folk-theorem equilibria just as group selection does. (similarity 0.84)
• Fairness distributions reflect bargaining power, not just effort. (similarity 0.84)
• Deriving fairness from bargaining power threatens to reduce moral norms to mere bargaining. (similarity 0.84)
• Morality evolves in two steps, from selfish reciprocity to intrinsic fairness. (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• Cooperative market norms can be stable equilibria even amid free-rider incentives #corroborates (0.80) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 190
• Fairness regulates rather than generates the moralized expression of evolved dispositions #complicates (0.75) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 692