Partner-choice cooperation theory does not explain the intrinsic moral sense.

Evidence

The mutualistic approach provides a straightforward explanation of why people should strive to be good partners in cooperation and respect the rights of others: If they failed to do so, they would incur the risk of being left out of future cooperative ventures. On the other hand, the theory of social selection as stated so far says very little about the proximal psychological mechanisms that are involved in helping individuals compete to be selected as partners in cooperation. In particular, the theory does not by itself explain why humans have a moral sense, why they feel guilty when they steal from others, and why they feel outraged when others are treated unfairly (Fessler & Haley 2003). — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 56

Categorization

  • QUESTION: The gap named here — why a moral sense exists beyond instrumental cooperativeness — is the theoretical problem the fumi-e becomes meaningful against: forcing public apostasy targets exactly the intrinsic (not instrumental) moral motivation.
  • XREF: connects to: Morality may have evolved via partner choice over partner control — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 347; Fairness is not reducible to mutualistic partner choice. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 567; Morality evolves from individual partner-choice competition, not group selection. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 605 (+1 more)