Unfair social arrangements collapse because the exploited side simply walks away.
Evidence
When individuals can freely choose how to allocate their resources across various social opportunities throughout their lives, biased splits disfavoring one side in an interaction are not evolutionarily stable because individuals then refuse to enter into such interactions when they happen to be on the disfavored side. This can be seen as a simple application of the marginal value theorem to social life (Charnov 1976): In evolutionary equilibrium, the marginal benefit of a unit of resource allocated to each possible activity (reproduction, foraging, somatic growth, etc.) must be the same. In the social domain, this entails, in particular, that the various sides of an interaction must benefit in the same manner from this interaction; otherwise, one of them is better off refusing. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 46
Categorization
- ADDENDUM: Directly supports the reading purpose linking the fumi-e to destroying partner choice: coerced participation short-circuits exactly this free-choice equilibrium that partners rely on to enforce fairness.
- XREF: The ‘exit rather than accept exploitation’ logic parallels Baumard’s partner-choice model and also Hirschman’s exit/voice framework. — connects to: Traditional social structures and orders can disintegrate over time
Related
- Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control (similarity 0.79)
- Fairness emerges when partner choice links each interaction to outside opportunities. (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Traditional social structures and orders can disintegrate over time
#qualifies(0.75)