Cooperation collapses once the threat of reputation-based punishment is removed.

Evidence

Every second group was told in round 17 that from then on only public goods rounds would follow until the end of the game. In these groups cooperation declined during the four public goods rounds, whereas cooperation was maintained when the risk of further rounds of indirect reciprocity was not excluded — Hans-Jürge, Reputation helps solve the `tragedy of…, 19

Categorization

• XREF: This is the experiment’s crux and matches the reader’s thesis: reputation effects only bind when future visibility is expected — background trust dissolves when the audience is known to be gone. — connects to: Cooperative behavior is partly motivated by reputation concerns. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 311; Reputation alone can sustain cooperation where direct reciprocity is impossible. — Hans-Jürge, Reputation helps solve the tragedy of…, 31</cite>; Reputation earned in one social game sustains cooperation in separate social dilemmas. — <cite>Hans-Jürge, Reputation helps solve the tragedy of…, 8 (+1 more)
• DEEPTHINKING: The cleanest demonstration that prosocial behavior is sustained not by internalized virtue but by the standing possibility of future social accounting — cooperation is a forward-looking strategy, not a state.

Related

• Reputation earned in one social game sustains cooperation in separate social dilemmas. (similarity 0.90)
• Reputation alone can sustain cooperation where direct reciprocity is impossible. (similarity 0.90)
• Alternating indirect reciprocity with public goods sustains cooperation that would otherwise collapse. (similarity 0.87)
• Reputation and anticipated repeat interactions drive stranger cooperation from the first round. (similarity 0.85)
• Cooperative behavior is partly motivated by reputation concerns. (similarity 0.84)
• People cooperate more when they expect repeated dealings or know a partner’s reputation (similarity 0.82)
• Competition for partners drives costly reputation-building cooperation. (similarity 0.82)
• Withholding help naturally damages reputation without any formal punishment rule. (similarity 0.81)
• Cooperation norms persist through credible punishment of defectors. (similarity 0.79)
• A genuine moral sense evolved to secure reputation as a cooperator (similarity 0.79)
• State unreliability cascades into mutual distrust that blocks cooperation (similarity 0.78)
• Once transcendent standards lapse, law collapses into whatever is good for the collective. (similarity 0.78)
• Cooperation requires knowing others’ motives and being believed trustworthy (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Cooperative behavior is partly motivated by reputation concerns. #corroborates (0.85) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 311
• Reputation alone can sustain cooperation where direct reciprocity is impossible. #contradicts (0.80) — Hans-Jürge, Reputation helps solve the `tragedy of…, 31
• Reputation earned in one social game sustains cooperation in separate social dilemmas. #corroborates (0.75) — Hans-Jürge, Reputation helps solve the `tragedy of…, 8