Repeated interaction among courtroom workgroup members promotes cooperative plea bargaining

Evidence

Also, participants in plea bargaining can justify the practice by insisting that trial is rarely warranted because weak cases are screened out early in the process. The only question in the remaining cases is the appropriate punishment for the defendant. Furthermore, each participant in plea bargaining recognizes that expeditious case processing requires a willingness to cooperate, and that the refusal to do so imposes burdens on other participants and may reduce their willingness to cooperate on future cases. In sum, the mutual interdependence of judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney, the prospect of continuing interaction among them, and the common goal of quick case processing all serve to reduce adversariness and promote the cooperative resolution of cases through plea bargaining. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1784

Categorization

• XREF: Mirrors Milgrom’s law-merchant argument that ongoing relationships function as a bond deterring dishonest dealing — here the bond produces cooperation rather than honesty. — connects to: Appellate judging is collaborative teamwork while trial judging is solitary authority — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 575; Repeat players in one courtroom develop shared familiarity that shapes plea bargaining — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1749; Plea bargaining persists even when caseload and evidence cannot explain it — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1773 (+13 more)
• SEED: Essay angle: plea bargaining as an informal reputation regime, where the real sanction for refusing to cooperate is future non-cooperation by judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney.

Broader Connections

• Plea bargaining persists even when caseload and evidence cannot explain it #complicates (0.95) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1773
• People cooperate more when they expect repeated dealings or know a partner’s reputation #corroborates (0.95) — Norenzayan, Ara, Big gods - how religion transformed…, 34
• Group entitativity experiments manipulate board cohesion through shared social activities #complicates (0.90) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 159
• Plea bargaining operates as a rough informal system of precedent #expands (0.85) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1751
• Cooperative pursuit of shared goals builds positive intergroup relations #expands (0.85) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1671
• Cooperative interaction sustains trustworthiness through ongoing institutions #qualifies (0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 680
• Cooperative behavior is partly motivated by reputation concerns. #expands (0.85) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 311
• Plea bargaining shifts sentencing control from legislatures to courtroom actors’ discretion #expands (0.75) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1809
• Rising caseloads without matching resources drove the spread of plea bargaining #qualifies (0.70) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 1765
• Collective guilt functions adaptively by motivating reparation and preventing repeated intergroup conflict #complicates (0.70) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 87
• Justice research conflates individual standing motives with collective group-integrity motives #complicates (0.70) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 2335
• Close intergroup contact breeds paternalistic reward of compliant subordinates #complicates (0.70)
• Competition within groups mirrors cooperation outgroup competition fosters binding. #complicates (0.70)
• Rising stakes and nonrandom relationships drive cooperation toward structured social groups #expands (0.70) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 631