Reputation alone can sustain cooperation where direct reciprocity is impossible.

Evidence

For the indirect reciprocity game'20, each person was assigned repeatedly as either a potential donor or a potential receiver. For example, a potential donor, say Telesto’, was asked on the public screen whether he would give to Galatea'. Telesto would loose DM 2.50 from his account and Galatea would gain DM 4 on her account if Telesto decided yes’. Telesto’s decision (yes or no) was displayed for 2 s on the public screen. Everybody knew about the contributions of all players, for example, whether Galatea had given in previous rounds when he/she had been playing as the potential donor. The subjects also knew that there would be no direct reciprocity; if Awas the potential donor of B, B would never be the potential donor of A. — Hans-Jürge, Reputation helps solve the `tragedy of…, 31

Categorization

• XREF: Directly parallels the reader’s reading purpose: how social control in Wharton’s 1870s New York operates through total visibility and audience effects rather than direct enforcement — reputation as capital (Milinski, Zucker). — connects to: Cooperation collapses once the threat of reputation-based punishment is removed. — Hans-Jürge, Reputation helps solve the tragedy of…, 19</cite>; Withholding help naturally damages reputation without any formal punishment rule. — <cite>Hans-Jürge, Reputation helps solve the tragedy of…, 28; Cooperation can operate independently of trust (+9 more)
• DEFINE: Operationally defines ‘indirect reciprocity’ as cooperation rewarded by observers’ evaluations rather than by the direct beneficiary.

Related

• Reputation earned in one social game sustains cooperation in separate social dilemmas. (similarity 0.91)
• Cooperation collapses once the threat of reputation-based punishment is removed. (similarity 0.90)
• Alternating indirect reciprocity with public goods sustains cooperation that would otherwise collapse. (similarity 0.85)
• Withholding help naturally damages reputation without any formal punishment rule. (similarity 0.83)
• Cooperative behavior is partly motivated by reputation concerns. (similarity 0.83)
• Reciprocity motivations can be self-reinforcing where further interactions are plentiful (similarity 0.80)
• Reputation and anticipated repeat interactions drive stranger cooperation from the first round. (similarity 0.80)
• State unreliability cascades into mutual distrust that blocks cooperation (similarity 0.78)
• Reputation means changing beliefs, not merely incentive-compatible behavior (similarity 0.78)
• People cooperate more when they expect repeated dealings or know a partner’s reputation (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Word-of-mouth reputation alone cannot sustain honest trade. #contradicts (0.85) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 38
• Reputation alone cannot sustain honest trading without third-party registration. #contradicts (0.85)
• Trust is a result rather than a precondition of cooperation #corroborates (0.80) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2781
• Reputation earned in one social game sustains cooperation in separate social dilemmas. #exemplifies (0.78) — Hans-Jürge, Reputation helps solve the `tragedy of…, 8
• Competition for partners drives costly reputation-building cooperation. #corroborates (0.75) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 531
• Cooperative behavior is partly motivated by reputation concerns. #expands (0.75) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 311
• Cooperation can operate independently of trust #expands (0.72)
• Cooperation can occur without trust when incentives align #expands (0.72)
• Coercion and interests alone compel cooperation even without shared values #expands (0.70)