A trustworthy reputation can be exploited because it is imperfectly known

Evidence

What is in fact needed if we want successful cooperative relations is trustworthiness, which is likely to beget trust from those who learn of our trustworthiness and recognize its utility in reputational and trial-and-error experience. Many writers claim that generalized trust— that is, individual trust of one another among citizens—has great value for society, even that it is necessary for society to function or to develop economically. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 793 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Make friends with people who want the best for you. — Jordan B. Peterson, 12 Rules for Life An Antidote to Chaos, 325 (#expands, via linked claim)

When I act in a way that seems to fit my interests, I might nevertheless assert that I am acting out of moral commitment, character, or something else. Moreover, I may be extremely good at acting in my interests and still be genuinely committed to the claim that my motivation is not that of self-interest. Given that more than one of these motivations—interests, morality, norms, identity—might govern my behavior, trustworthiness, and therefore trust, can be overdetermined. We often begin with a bit of risk taking that leads to simple trust as encapsulated interest, and then we develop such a rich relationship that other motivations come into play. I might also have normative commitments in some context that are quite independent of any grounding in interests, and I may have interests in that context as well, and either might be sufficient to motivate my trustworthiness. — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 411 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: A cheater’s success is parasitic on surrounding trustworthy institutions; One can invest only in reputation, never directly in trustworthiness; Reputation matters but cannot substitute for direct experiential testing (+15 more)

Related

• Trustworthiness begets trust via reputation and repeated dealings (similarity 0.87)
• One can invest only in reputation, never directly in trustworthiness (similarity 0.86)
• Reputation can inform decisions about personal associations. (similarity 0.86)
• Acting on mistaken assumptions about reputation can still yield trust (similarity 0.83)
• Reputation means changing beliefs, not merely incentive-compatible behavior (similarity 0.83)
• Assessing another’s trustworthiness requires direct or reputational knowledge (similarity 0.81)
• Only incentives, not investment, can genuinely change trustworthiness. (similarity 0.81)
• Group-wide reputation can bond honest behavior even between strangers who rarely meet. (similarity 0.81)
• Reputations work as future-oriented constraints that bind their holders (similarity 0.81)
• Reputation effects can substitute for direct iterated exchange in producing trustworthiness (similarity 0.80)
• Reputation signals trust but experience substitutes for it (similarity 0.80)
• Trustworthiness can be causally overdetermined by multiple independent motivations. (similarity 0.80)
• Reputation is the public inference of another’s qualities from imperfect observed data (similarity 0.80)
• Trust requires repeated encounters, memory, costly honesty, and earned reputation (similarity 0.80)
• Optimism about others’ trustworthiness is self-reinforcing through gained experience (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Trustworthiness begets trust via reputation and repeated dealings #complicates (0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 793
• Reputation can inform decisions about personal associations. #expands (0.80) — Jordan B. Peterson, 12 Rules for Life An Antidote to Chaos, 325
• Trustworthiness can be causally overdetermined by multiple independent motivations. #expands (0.75) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 411