Small groups succeed at collective action because dyadic trust motivates cooperation

Evidence

When transferred to the human world, the evolutionary approach might a fortiori suggest that trust would be better understood as a result rather than a precondition of cooperation. Trust would exist in societies and groups which are successful because of their ability to cooperate, and would consist in nothing more than trust in the success of previous cooperation. Cooperation could be triggered not by trust, but simply by a set of fortunate practices, random at first, and then selectively retained (with varying degrees of learning and intentionality). — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2781 (#contradicts, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Groups induce cooperation through sanctions even without trusting their members — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 808; Cooperation can operate independently of trust; Trust is a result rather than a precondition of cooperation — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2781 (+12 more)

Related

• Groups induce cooperation through sanctions even without trusting their members (similarity 0.88)
• Cooperation can occur without trust when incentives align (similarity 0.88)
• Dyadic trust relationships let small groups succeed where large ones fail. (similarity 0.88)
• Highly cooperative societies can sustain mutual trust without religion. (similarity 0.85)
• Explaining how cooperative groups formed requires enforcement mechanisms, not just expulsion of the asocial. (similarity 0.82)
• Cooperation has no single solution; motivations combine and overdetermine action (similarity 0.82)
• Small communities enforce generalized reciprocity rather than one-on-one exchange (similarity 0.81)
• Trust is a small-scale phenomenon that institutions must replace to enable large-scale cooperation (similarity 0.81)
• Sanctions make trustworthiness a matter of self-interest rather than personal concern (similarity 0.80)
• Explaining trust requires understanding the conditions of cooperation (similarity 0.80)
• Cooperation rests on coercion, interests, values, and personal bonds (similarity 0.80)
• Cooperation is broader than trust and mostly grounded in institutions, not trust. (similarity 0.80)
• Cooperative equilibria are no likelier than noncooperative ones without belief restrictions (similarity 0.80)
• Institutions enabling safe cooperation must precede trustworthiness, which precedes trust (similarity 0.80)
• Coercion and interests alone compel cooperation even without shared values (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Cooperation can operate independently of trust #contradicts (0.85)
• Trust is a result rather than a precondition of cooperation #contradicts (0.80) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2781
• Trust is a small-scale phenomenon that institutions must replace to enable large-scale cooperation #qualifies (0.80)
• Cooperation can occur without trust when incentives align #contradicts (0.80)
• Close communities substitute communal sanctioning norms for dyadic trust relationships #contradicts (0.75)
• Collective-retaliation threat, encoded in honour culture, sustains group trust #expands (0.75)
• Cooperation has no single solution; motivations combine and overdetermine action #qualifies (0.75)
• Trust requires both freedom to defect and constraints that make cooperation attractive #qualifies (0.75)