Reputation earned in one social game sustains cooperation in separate social dilemmas.

Evidence

Indirect reciprocity8, give and you shall receive', is built on reputation and can sustain a high level of cooperation, as shown by game theorists9±11. Here we show, through alternating rounds of public goods and indirect reciprocity games, that the need to maintain reputation for indirect reciprocity maintains contributions to the public good at an unexpectedly high level. But if rounds of indirect reciprocation are not expected, then contributions to the public good drop quickly to zero. Alternating the games leads to higher pro®ts for all players. As reputation may be a currency that is valid in many social games, our approach could be used to test social dilemmas for their solubility. — <cite>Hans-Jürge, Reputation helps solve the tragedy of…, 8

Categorization

• XREF: Directly supports the reader’s analytic thread on reputation as essential capital and background trust in elite 1870s New York society. — connects to: Cooperative behavior is partly motivated by reputation concerns. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 311; Competition for partners drives costly reputation-building cooperation. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 531; Alternating indirect reciprocity with public goods sustains cooperation that would otherwise collapse. — Hans-Jürge, Reputation helps solve the `tragedy of…, 16 (+4 more)
• QUESTION: The mechanism is intriguing — worth chasing whether reputation carries over across genuinely different domains in real social settings, not just lab games.

Related

• Reputation alone can sustain cooperation where direct reciprocity is impossible. (similarity 0.91)
• Cooperation collapses once the threat of reputation-based punishment is removed. (similarity 0.90)
• Alternating indirect reciprocity with public goods sustains cooperation that would otherwise collapse. (similarity 0.88)
• Reputation and anticipated repeat interactions drive stranger cooperation from the first round. (similarity 0.83)
• People cooperate more when they expect repeated dealings or know a partner’s reputation (similarity 0.81)
• Competition for partners drives costly reputation-building cooperation. (similarity 0.80)
• Players’ full giving histories are made visible to everyone in the group. (similarity 0.80)
• Cooperative behavior is partly motivated by reputation concerns. (similarity 0.80)
• Withholding help naturally damages reputation without any formal punishment rule. (similarity 0.79)
• Reciprocity motivations can be self-reinforcing where further interactions are plentiful (similarity 0.78)
• Hans-Jürge — Reputation helps solve the `tragedy of the commons (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Cooperative behavior is partly motivated by reputation concerns. #corroborates (0.82) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 311
• Alternating indirect reciprocity with public goods sustains cooperation that would otherwise collapse. #expands (0.78) — Hans-Jürge, Reputation helps solve the `tragedy of…, 16
• Competition for partners drives costly reputation-building cooperation. #expands (0.75) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 531
• Particular encounters acquire symbolic weight because players know reputation is at stake #expands (0.74) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 381
• Reputation means changing beliefs, not merely incentive-compatible behavior #qualifies (0.72)