Reputational self-interest alone cannot explain why people act morally when unobserved.

Evidence

In principle, people could behave as good partners and do well in the social selection competition not out of any moral sense and without any moral emotion, but by wholly relying only upon self-serving motivations. They could take into account others’ interests when this affects their chances of being chosen as partners in future cooperation and not otherwise. They could ignore others’ interests when their doing so could not be observed or inferred by others. This is the way intelligent sociopaths tend to behave (Cima et al. 2010; Hare 1993; Mealey 1995). Sociopaths can be very skilled at dealing with others: They may bargain, make concessions, and be generous, but they only do so in order to maximize their own benefit. They never pay a cost without expectation of a greater benefit. Although normal people also do act morally for self-serving motives and take into account the reputational effect of their actions (see, e.g., Haley & Fessler 2005; Hoffman et al. 1996; Rigdon et al. 2009), the experimental literature has consistently shown that most individuals – in particular in anonymous situations – commonly respect others’ interests even when it is not in their own interest to do so. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 57

Categorization

• XREF: Connects directly to the reader’s Big God / fumi-e framework — the mutualistic account must explain the intrinsic moral sense because pure reputation-tracking predicts sociopathic behavior in anonymous settings, exactly the loophole public apostasy rituals exploit. — connects to: Moral dispositions resist contrary incentives yet people overestimate their behavioral role — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 216; Human moral behavior may originate in mere conformity to convention, not genuine morality. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 541; Human morality is contingent rather than invariant across circumstances. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 390 (+3 more)

Related

• Moral gossip targets more than fairness, tracking loyalty and norm adherence too. (similarity 0.83)
• Moralistic punishment of defectors is itself a costly reputational signal. (similarity 0.81)
• A genuine moral sense evolved to secure reputation as a cooperator (similarity 0.80)
• Competitive signalling may drive moral conduct beyond mere fairness. (similarity 0.80)
• Cooperative behavior is partly motivated by reputation concerns. (similarity 0.79)
• Genuinely moral partners signal higher reliability than strategically moral ones. (similarity 0.79)
• Genuine moral commitments resist monetary incentives to switch (similarity 0.79)
• Informal moral behavior builds reputation through accumulated small signals, defeating free-riding. (similarity 0.79)
• Partner-choice cooperation theory does not explain the intrinsic moral sense. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• No one assigns infinite weight to their own honesty when incentives grow #contradicts (0.85)
• Sanctions make trustworthiness a matter of self-interest rather than personal concern #contradicts (0.82)
• Moral dispositions resist contrary incentives yet people overestimate their behavioral role #qualifies (0.80) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 216
• Human moral behavior may originate in mere conformity to convention, not genuine morality. #qualifies (0.78) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 541
• Human morality is contingent rather than invariant across circumstances. #expands (0.72) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 390