Small first-strike temptations can compound into attack through interacting expectations alone

Evidence

But, if the gains from even successful surprise are less desired than no war at all, there is no “fundamental” basis for an attack by either side. Nevertheless, it looks as though a modest temptation on each side to sneak in a first blow—a temptation too small by itself to motivate an attack—might become compounded through a process of interacting expectations, with additional motive for attack being produced by successive cycles of “He thinks we think he thinks we think…he thinks we think he’ll attack; so he thinks we shall; so he will; so we must.” — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 462

Categorization

• DEEPTHINKING: The central amplification mechanism of the chapter: a modest temptation, no fundamental basis, yet infinite regress of mutual suspicion generates motive. Dense and paradigm-shifting for the reader’s whole project.
• XREF: connects to: Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 491; Preclusive self-defense can itself provoke the attack it tries to avert — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 461; Sudden escalation of stakes can transform iterated trust into one-shot opportunism (+5 more)

Related

• Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking (similarity 0.88)
• Fear of surprise attack produces all-or-none outcomes, not probability multiplication. (similarity 0.86)
• Even a player sure of his own restraint inherits the other’s amplified fears (similarity 0.84)
• Preclusive self-defense can itself provoke the attack it tries to avert (similarity 0.82)
• Suicide attacks correlate with and spread through visible self-sacrifice cycles (similarity 0.81)
• First-strike advantage converts defensive fear into preemptive violence spirals. (similarity 0.80)
• Both secrets and certain capabilities are best renounced under mutual suspicion. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking #exemplifies (0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 491
• Preclusive self-defense can itself provoke the attack it tries to avert #exemplifies (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 461
• Sudden escalation of stakes can transform iterated trust into one-shot opportunism #expands (0.80)
• Reciprocity motivations can be self-reinforcing where further interactions are plentiful #expands (0.75)