Anticipated future interaction makes people substantially more cooperative

Evidence

Pruitt and Kimmel (1976) examined the extensive literature on the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, and concluded that one important consideration for subjects is whether or not they view the interchange from a short-term or long-term perspective. In particular, if subjects believed that they would need to interact with each other after the study was concluded, and therefore the usual social and temporal isolation of such interactions was removed, their behaviour became considerably more cooperative. This result is, of course, consistent with many other findings and proposals from the economic and game-theoretic literature The second and third findings derive principally from the Trucking Game, which is due to Deutsch and Krauss (1960). — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 554

Pruitt and Kimmel (1976) examined the extensive literature on the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, and concluded that one important consideration for subjects is whether or not they view the interchange from a short-term or long-term perspective. In particular, if subjects believed that they would need to interact with each other after the study was concluded, and therefore the usual social and temporal isolation of such interactions was removed, their behaviour became considerably more cooperative. — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 554

Categorization

• XREF: Directly connects to the reader’s Luhmann/Hardin thesis: future observability of continued interaction underwrites trust, the exact mechanism blindness destroys in Saramago. — connects to: Natural selection and rational foresight jointly produce group cohesion though proportions are unknown; Cooperation unravels without iterated mutual knowledge of cooperative intentions.; Reciprocity motivations can be self-reinforcing where further interactions are plentiful (+10 more)
• ADDENDUM: Connects to the reader’s trust-and-observability theme: knowledge that interaction persists removes the shadow-of-the-future discounting, matching the book’s interest in expectations of continued dealings.
• corroborated: 3 independent passages support this claim — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 554

Broader Connections

• Reciprocity motivations can be self-reinforcing where further interactions are plentiful #corroborates (0.85)
• Future gains from continued interaction function as both incentive and sanction for trust. #expands (0.85)
• Small groups succeed at collective action because dyadic trust motivates cooperation #exemplifies (0.85)
• Reciprocated cooperation teaches one to internalize others’ interests #expands (0.80)
• Initial cooperation can wreck backward induction and build rational trust #expands (0.80) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 606
• Cooperation-focused strategies fail where conditions for cooperation are themselves absent #qualifies (0.80)
• Trust is a result rather than a precondition of cooperation #corroborates (0.80) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2781
• Cooperation unravels without iterated mutual knowledge of cooperative intentions. #qualifies (0.75)
• Egoistic micro-motivation lacks momentum across cases of cooperation #complicates (0.75)
• Small communities enforce generalized reciprocity rather than one-on-one exchange #exemplifies (0.75) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 821