Ethnic balancing under authoritarian rule built cooperative Zambian elites

Evidence

First, ethnic balancing during authoritarian rule fostered a culture of cooperation within the Zambian elite, rather than rivalry based on ethno-regional differences. Not only was elite bargaining common, it was also inclusive by involving elites from a broad set of ethnic groups (Burnell, 2005; Lindemann, 2011). — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 88

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Kenya and Zambia share parallel histories of single-party rule and ethnic geography — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 41; Zambia’s one-party state suppressed ethnic mobilization through balancing and unifying rhetoric — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 71; Zambia’s single-party state avoided ethnically skewed resource distribution — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 75 (+4 more)

Related

• Zambia’s single-party state avoided ethnically skewed resource distribution (similarity 0.91)
• Zambia’s one-party state suppressed ethnic mobilization through balancing and unifying rhetoric (similarity 0.91)
• Kenya and Zambia share parallel histories of single-party rule and ethnic geography (similarity 0.90)
• Authoritarian-era coalition-building logics explain later divergence in electoral violence between Kenya and Zambia. (similarity 0.88)
• Exclusionary versus cooperative elite coalition legacies shape post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.85)
• Zambia’s 1990 transition united leaders across ethnic lines (similarity 0.85)
• Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.85)
• Kenya’s single-party rule used shifting ethnic coalition-building to concentrate state access in few groups. (similarity 0.85)
• Perceived regional imbalance in Zambia’s ruling party fed recurring accusations of ethnic bias (similarity 0.84)
• Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not. (similarity 0.84)
• Authoritarian coalition-building approaches shape post-transition political incentives. (similarity 0.83)
• Kenneth Kaunda’s Zambia confined ethnic competition by banning rival parties early on (similarity 0.82)
• African ruling coalitions nearly always include some ethno-regional intermediaries, but inclusion depth varies (similarity 0.82)
• Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund — Electoral violence and the legacy of authoritarian rule in Kenya and Zambia (similarity 0.81)
• Exclusionary ethnic coalition-building emerged only after Kenya’s broad early post-independence ruling alliance. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Authoritarian-era coalition-building logics explain later divergence in electoral violence between Kenya and Zambia. #expands (0.82) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 95
• Authoritarian regime stability ultimately rests on informal patronage networks brokered by ethnic elites #corroborates (0.78) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 22