Authoritarian-era coalition-building logics explain later divergence in electoral violence between Kenya and Zambia.
Evidence
Importantly, the mode of coalition-building was also underpinned by different logics: ‘[w]hereas in Kenya political life has been characterized by open deployment of ethnic self-interest, in Zambia it has been more covert and intermingled with other forms of allegiance – for example, on material grounds’ (Larmer, 2011: 274). Both approaches were strategies for regime survival and help to explain why electoral violence occurred in Kenya, but not in Zambia. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 95
Categorization
- XREF: Connects directly to the threatened-privilege mobilization mechanism being tested across regime types — this is the authoritarian-legacy version of that mechanism. — connects to: Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 4; Authoritarian coalition-building approaches shape post-transition political incentives. — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 30; Kenya and Zambia share parallel histories of single-party rule and ethnic geography — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 41 (+10 more)
- QUESTION: Worth chasing: is the covert-ethnicity-logic (material allegiance in Zambia) itself a product of ‘threatened privilege,’ or a distinct mechanism that could exist in pluralist democracies too?
Related
- Inclusive versus exclusive authoritarian ruling coalitions shape electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.91)
- Exclusionary authoritarian coalitions seed later electoral violence while inclusive ones do not. (similarity 0.91)
- Authoritarian coalition-building approaches shape post-transition political incentives. (similarity 0.89)
- Exclusionary versus cooperative elite coalition legacies shape post-transition electoral violence risk. (similarity 0.89)
- Ethnic balancing under authoritarian rule built cooperative Zambian elites (similarity 0.88)
- Kenya and Zambia share parallel histories of single-party rule and ethnic geography (similarity 0.87)
- Authoritarian-rule legacies plausibly drive electoral violence beyond Africa (similarity 0.87)
- Zambia’s single-party state avoided ethnically skewed resource distribution (similarity 0.85)
- Zambia’s one-party state suppressed ethnic mobilization through balancing and unifying rhetoric (similarity 0.85)
- Exclusionary ethnic coalition-building emerged only after Kenya’s broad early post-independence ruling alliance. (similarity 0.84)
- Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund — Electoral violence and the legacy of authoritarian rule in Kenya and Zambia (similarity 0.83)
- Kenya’s single-party rule used shifting ethnic coalition-building to concentrate state access in few groups. (similarity 0.83)
- Authoritarian regimes vary in how inclusively they build ethnic ruling coalitions. (similarity 0.82)
- Kenneth Kaunda’s Zambia confined ethnic competition by banning rival parties early on (similarity 0.82)
- Zambia’s 1990 transition united leaders across ethnic lines (similarity 0.82)
Broader Connections
- Exclusionary versus cooperative elite coalition legacies shape post-transition electoral violence risk.
#corroborates(0.85) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 96 - Authoritarian-rule legacies plausibly drive electoral violence beyond Africa
#expands(0.78) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 104 - Authoritarian regimes’ breadth of ethnic inclusion shapes post-transition electoral violence risk.
#qualifies(0.75) — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 10