A threat backed by reputation cannot be unilaterally renounced by its target

Evidence

The threat may seem to be a promise if the pledge behind it is only one’s reputation with his adversary; but it is not a promise from which the second party can unilaterally release the threatener, since he cannot convincingly dissociate his own future estimate of the threatener from the latter’s performance. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 720

Categorization

• XREF: Connects directly to the reader’s Gambetta framework on how Mafia threats are backed by reputation hostages rather than enforceable contracts. — connects to: A protection firm’s reputation substitutes for and economizes on violence; Institutional reputation makes threats more credible than individual threats — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 80; A fulfilled threat gains credibility from its value to future threats, not present gain — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 83 (+3 more)

Related

• A fulfilled threat gains credibility from its value to future threats, not present gain (similarity 0.86)
• Institutional reputation makes threats more credible than individual threats (similarity 0.81)
• Failed threats create joint incentives to undo commitments that parties cannot jointly undo (similarity 0.81)
• A credible threat works precisely because it need never be carried out. (similarity 0.80)
• A threat must be credible and credible threats require commitment (similarity 0.79)
• A protection firm’s reputation substitutes for and economizes on violence (similarity 0.79)
• A threat only coerces when the threatener has visibly left himself no choice (similarity 0.79)
• Threats require commitment, not comparative damage to both parties (similarity 0.78)
• Threats gain credibility by decomposing into a series of smaller demonstrated steps (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Institutional reputation makes threats more credible than individual threats #corroborates (0.92) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 80
• A fulfilled threat gains credibility from its value to future threats, not present gain #expands (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 83
• Hinted threats gain credibility precisely because they are deniable #complicates (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 781