A punisher’s own gains do not reduce punishment of unrelated violators.

Evidence

There is one aspect of the data that neither the Fehr–Schmidt nor Falk–Fischbacher model predicts satisfactorily. Recall that third-party punishment was not significantly affected by the sum received from one’s own dictator (see regression 2 in Table 3). This contradicts both models because the more a third party receives from his or her own dictator, the less reason there is for him or her to punish the dictator in the other group, since the income difference between the third party and the dictator in the other group becomes smaller if one’s own dictator transfers more. The insignificant impact of one’s own dictator’s transfer on thirdparty punishment is consistent with Levine’s model, however, because the behavior of one’s own dictator does not affect inferences about the dictator’s preferences in the other group. — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 109

Categorization

• XREF: Links to my Hester Prynne image-scoring frame: a third party punishes on signal alone, not on relative income, matching a costly-signaling account of moral outrage that is not self-interested in pecuniary terms. — connects to: Even inequality-aversion models fail to explain punishment that is costly to the punisher — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 66; Punishment scales with the unfairness of the wrongdoing, not with deterrence needs — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 103; Some punishment in public goods games is retributive justice-seeking, not cooperation enforcement. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 185

Related

• Third parties punish inequality even when it does not directly involve them. (similarity 0.86)
• Even inequality-aversion models fail to explain punishment that is costly to the punisher (similarity 0.85)
• Different social-preference models make distinguishable predictions about who punishes. (similarity 0.85)
• Third-party punishment scales with how far selfish transfers fall short of fairness norms. (similarity 0.83)
• Impartial third parties punish norm violators at personal cost. (similarity 0.83)
• Researchers distinguish punishment by a harmed party from punishment by an unaffected third party. (similarity 0.83)
• Punishment scales with the unfairness of the wrongdoing, not with deterrence needs (similarity 0.83)
• People punish free-riders partly to correct inequality, not only to enforce cooperation. (similarity 0.82)
• People spend their own money to punish and reward strangers with no future benefit. (similarity 0.82)
• An impartial third party who punishes at personal cost demonstrates strong reciprocity. (similarity 0.82)
• Second-party sanctions are contaminated by self-interest; third-party sanctions reveal true norms. (similarity 0.81)
• Third-party punishment is weaker than second-party punishment. (similarity 0.81)
• Some punishment in public goods games is retributive justice-seeking, not cooperation enforcement. (similarity 0.80)
• Third-party punishment games enable empirical study of social norms. (similarity 0.80)
• Directly harmed victims punish more strongly than unaffected third parties. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Even inequality-aversion models fail to explain punishment that is costly to the punisher #corroborates (0.75) — Ernst Fehr, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 66