Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games

Evidence

In a zero-sum game the analyst is really dealing with only a single center of consciousness, a single source of decision. True, there are two players, each with his own consciousness; but mini-max strategy converts the situation into one involving two essentially unilateral decisions. No spark of recognition needs to jump between the two players; no meeting of minds is required; no hints have to be conveyed; no impressions, images, or understandings have to be compared. No social perception is involved. But in the mixed-motive game, two or more centers of consciousness are dependent on each other in an essential way. Something has to be communicated; at least some spark of recognition must pass between the players. There is generally a necessity for some social activity, however rudimentary or tacit it may be; and both players are dependent to some degree on the success of their social perception and interaction. Even two completely isolated individuals, who play with each other in absolute silence and without even knowing each other’s identity, must tacitly reach some meeting of minds. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 367

Categorization

• DEFINE: Clarifies what distinguishes mixed-motive from zero-sum: the need for tacit meeting of minds.
• XREF: connects to: Move asymmetry is what makes cooperative game theory interesting. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 641; Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 669; Partial randomization can turn a conflict-addled game into a profitable equilibrium — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 747 (+12 more)

Related

• Coordination play seeks a meeting of minds while minimax play avoids any (similarity 0.86)
• Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences (similarity 0.86)
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.86)
• Move asymmetry is what makes cooperative game theory interesting. (similarity 0.85)
• Rational players must factor non-mathematical focal details into strategy (similarity 0.83)
• Rational players cannot opt out of social coordination when efficiency requires it (similarity 0.82)
• Game theory succeeds on pure conflict but fails on mixed conflict-cooperation (similarity 0.82)
• Any theory of strategic coordination has an inherently empirical component (similarity 0.81)
• Coordinate behavior emerges from conventions and impromptu codes without explicit plans (similarity 0.81)
• Strategic principles in mixed-motive games cannot be derived purely analytically (similarity 0.80)
• Pure symmetry can single out a unique tacit-coordination point (similarity 0.80)
• Threats and promises are meaningless in zero-sum games (similarity 0.80)
• Formal game theory abstracted away the communication and enforcement systems it needs (similarity 0.79)
• Tacit bargaining over distribution can be conducted only through play itself. (similarity 0.79)
• Mixed strategies primarily prevent the opponent’s anticipation of one’s choice. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players #corroborates (0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 858
• Rational players cannot opt out of social coordination when efficiency requires it #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 370
• Strategic principles in mixed-motive games cannot be derived purely analytically #expands (0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 366
• Individual motives become social only through forms of mutual interaction #expands (0.75) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 194