Move asymmetry is what makes cooperative game theory interesting.

Evidence

The cooperative game is rich and meaningful when “moves” are admitted; and much of the significance of the moves will vanish if complete symmetry in their availability to the players is stamped into the definition of the game. It is the moves that are interesting, not the game without moves; and it is the potential asymmetry of the moves that makes them most interesting. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 641

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Perfect move symmetry neutralizes all interesting bargaining moves in advance. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 634; Non-symmetric moves like commitments and threats enrich cooperative games. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 635; Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 367 (+2 more)

Related

• Perfect move symmetry neutralizes all interesting bargaining moves in advance. (similarity 0.91)
• Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games (similarity 0.85)
• Non-symmetric moves like commitments and threats enrich cooperative games. (similarity 0.85)
• Pure symmetry can single out a unique tacit-coordination point (similarity 0.82)
• Coordination play seeks a meeting of minds while minimax play avoids any (similarity 0.81)
• Non-symmetry beats both committed symmetry and committed asymmetry. (similarity 0.81)
• Game theory succeeds on pure conflict but fails on mixed conflict-cooperation (similarity 0.80)
• Binding-agreement machinery becomes irrelevant under perfect symmetry (similarity 0.79)
• Any theory of strategic coordination has an inherently empirical component (similarity 0.78)
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 367
• Coordination play seeks a meeting of minds while minimax play avoids any #expands (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 229
• Foot-binding and FGC persisted as game-theoretic equilibria, not cultural preference #exemplifies (0.72) — , The Rod and the Child, 7331