Most conflicts are variable-sum games with common interests

Evidence

Thus, strategy—in the sense in which I am using it here—is not concerned with the efficient application of force but with the exploitation of potential force. It is concerned not just with enemies who dislike each other but with partners who distrust or disagree with each other. It is concerned not just with the division of gains and losses between two claimants but with the possibility that particular outcomes are worse (better) for both claimants than certain other outcomes. In the terminology of game theory, most interesting international conflicts are not “constant-sum games” but “variable-sum games”: the sum of the gains of the participants involved is not fixed so that more for one inexorably means less for the other. There is a common interest in reaching outcomes that are mutually advantageous. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 20

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines ‘constant-sum’ vs ‘variable-sum games’ as the crux of strategic theory.
• XREF: Connects to Milgrom/North/Weingast’s private judges and Gambetta’s private protection: the Godfather’s intervention creates a Pareto-superior variable-sum outcome where both Bonasera and the justice system (formal channels) end up better off than under pure conflict. — connects to: Partial randomization can turn a conflict-addled game into a profitable equilibrium — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 747; Conflict settings share common-interest structures across wildly different scales — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 7; Game theory succeeds on pure conflict but fails on mixed conflict-cooperation — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 202 (+1 more)

Related

• Game theory succeeds on pure conflict but fails on mixed conflict-cooperation (similarity 0.86)
• Conflict settings share common-interest structures across wildly different scales (similarity 0.86)
• Pure conflict almost never occurs even in war (similarity 0.81)
• Even conflict between adversaries can be modeled as partnership discipline (similarity 0.80)
• Conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations (similarity 0.80)
• Strategic principles in mixed-motive games cannot be derived purely analytically (similarity 0.80)
• Formal game theory abstracted away the communication and enforcement systems it needs (similarity 0.79)
• Partial randomization can turn a conflict-addled game into a profitable equilibrium (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Game theory succeeds on pure conflict but fails on mixed conflict-cooperation #qualifies (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 202
• Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games #corroborates (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 367