Threats and promises are meaningless in zero-sum games
Evidence
Suggestions and inferences, threats and promises, are of no consequence in the accepted theory of zero-sum games. They are of no consequence because they imply a relation between the two players that, unless perfectly innocuous, must be to the disadvantage of one player; and he can destroy it by adopting a minimax strategy, based, if necessary, on a randomizing mechanism. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 204
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: A randomized minimax strategy deliberately destroys all communication between players — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 250; Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 367; Non-symmetric moves like commitments and threats enrich cooperative games. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 635 (+2 more)
Related
- A randomized minimax strategy deliberately destroys all communication between players (similarity 0.84)
- Coordination play seeks a meeting of minds while minimax play avoids any (similarity 0.83)
- Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games (similarity 0.80)
- Non-symmetric moves like commitments and threats enrich cooperative games. (similarity 0.79)
- Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- A randomized minimax strategy deliberately destroys all communication between players
#expands(0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 250 - Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game
#qualifies(0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 299 - Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games
#corroborates(0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 367 - Non-symmetric moves like commitments and threats enrich cooperative games.
#contradicts(0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 635