Rational players cannot opt out of social coordination when efficiency requires it

Evidence

But in a nonzero-sum game that involves any initial uncertainty over which among the possible outcomes are in fact efficient and any need for coordinated mutual accommodation to get to an efficient outcome, a rational player cannot absent himself in self-defense from the social process; he cannot turn off his hearing aid to avoid being constrained by what he hears, if complete radio silence makes efficient collaboration impossible. Nor can he rationally fail to open a letter, once it is delivered, since the other party will have assumed that he will open it and have acted accordingly. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 370

Categorization

• XREF: Directly parallels why a supplicant like Bonasera cannot ‘turn off his hearing aid’ — he must engage the Corleone social/coordination machinery because state channels fail. — connects to: Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 851; Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 367; Cooperation-focused strategies fail where conditions for cooperation are themselves absent (+6 more)

Related

• Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences (similarity 0.84)
• Mixed-motive games require tacit social coordination absent from zero-sum games (similarity 0.82)
• Rational players must factor non-mathematical focal details into strategy (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players #corroborates (0.92) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 858
• Cooperation-focused strategies fail where conditions for cooperation are themselves absent #qualifies (0.85)
• Strategic principles in mixed-motive games cannot be derived purely analytically #complicates (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 366